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Abstract
Numerous studies have documented the advances in ICT equipment, in particular IT hardware, and
its contribution to growth in both the US and Europe. Less has been done to measure the contribution
of communications technology, the C in ICT. In this paper we focus on the direct eﬀect of CT capital
deepening on labour productivity in a sources of growth framework. We construct an international dataset
composed of the US and thirteen European countries and produce new estimates of the contribution of
ICT capital over the period 1995-2013. We present contributions to labour productivity for each ICT
asset (IT hardware, CT equipment and software) using alternative ICT deﬂators from national statistical
institutes, harmonised deﬂators from the OECD and our own harmonised deﬂators. We ﬁnd that: (a)
there are still considerable disparities in measures of ICT price change across OECD countries; (b)
however, in terms of growth-accounting estimates, harmonisation of price indices has a greater impact
on the measured contributions of IT hardware and software in the EU relative to the US, rather than
that of CT equipment; (c) thus, diﬀerences between the US and EU in terms of the contribution of CT
capital deepening are largely due to diﬀerences in measured CT capital services and the CT income share,
whereas of the diﬀerences in the contribution of IT hardware (and to a lesser extent, software) capital
deepening, more is explained by diﬀerences in the estimated price of IT hardware (software); (d) over
the period 2000-13, using national ICT deﬂators, CT capital deepening accounted for 0.09% pa (5.7% as
a share) of growth in labour productivity in the US, compared to 0.02% pa (1.9% as a share of labour
productivity growth) in the EU-13; (e) using harmonised ICT deﬂators from the OECD, the ﬁgure for
the EU-13 rises to 0.04% pa (3.9% as a share) of growth in labour productivity.
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1 Introduction
Numerous studies have sought to measure the contribution of ICT equipment to growth in GDP or labour
productivity. Within the ﬁeld of growth-accounting, studies include those from EUKLEMS ((O'Mahony
and Timmer, 2009);(Van Ark and Inklaar, 2005)) and earlier studies from Oulton (2002) for the UK and
Jorgenson (2001) for the US. However the focus of these studies has generally been on the contribution of
ICT equipment, with ICT equipment separated out from non-ICT plant & machinery in the estimation of
capital services. This separation allows for improved estimation of capital services from ICT and aggregate
capital, with ICT equipment given its own speciﬁc depreciation rate (allowing for a higher gross rate of
return to ICT assets which typically have a shorter life-length than other types of machinery) and an ICT-
speciﬁc quality-adjusted deﬂator, which captures increases in the eﬀective volume of ICT investment, due to
improvements in the power or eﬃciency of the underlying technology.
The focus on computer hardware or aggregate ICT equipment means however that the C part of ICT has
been somewhat neglected ((Doms, 2005)(Byrne and Corrado, 2009)(Corrado, 2011b)(OECD, 2008)). When
we consider the role and ubiquity of the internet in business activity, this is potentially important. Further,
if communications networks generate network eﬀects (or spillovers), then the contribution of telecommuni-
cations equipment may also be an implicit component of growth in total factor productivity (TFP).
In this paper we create an international dataset, that includes the US and thirteen European economies, to
study the contribution of telecommunications capital (CT) to growth across countries. Following on from the
research into IT hardware equipment documented above, we therefore treat all three aspects of ICT capital,
including telecommunications equipment (i.e. IT hardware, CT equipment and software), as distinct assets
in the estimation of capital services, each with their own asset-speciﬁc depreciation rate and price index. We
use these data to review growth-accounting estimates for each of the three types of ICT capital1 in Europe,
relative to the US, using the national deﬂators applied in the national accounts of individual countries and
submitted to the OECD by national statistical institutes (NSIs) as a benchmark, and also experimenting
with sets of harmonised deﬂators consistent with the hedonic price index produced by the US Bureau of
Economic Analysis (BEA), including the harmonised ICT deﬂators produced by the OECD (Schreyer and
Colecchia, 2002).2
The OECD harmonised deﬂators are typically more aggressive3 than national ICT price indices, being
based on US constant-quality price indices for IT, CT and software.4 Thus, in the case of CT, the OECD
harmonised index sets the ratio of the price of CT capital to non-ICT capital in each country equal to the
ratio in the US, so that movements in the price of CT capital relative to non-ICT capital in the US also
1 Another aspect of investment in ICT or digital assets is investment in data. In the System of National Accounts (SNA),
the nomenclature for the asset category which includes software is actually computerised information, which consists of
software but also databases. However, it is thought that current national accounting methods do not well measure what are
fast growing investments in data assets. To the extent that data (as an asset) is currently measured in the national accounts,
it is an implicit part of the data for software. Therefore in this paper, where we refer to software, we are actually referring
to computerised information which includes databases. In a series of papers, Goodridge and Haskel (e.g. (Goodridge et al.,
2015), Goodridge and Haskel (2015b), Goodridge and Haskel (2015a), Goodridge and Haskel (2016)) attempt to measure UK
market sector investment in data and its contribution to growth, including an estimate of just how much of that investment
is already recorded in the UK national accounts.
2 We thank Vincenzo Spiezia of the OECD for sending us these data.
3 For instance, the national deﬂator for CT equipment for Spain rises at an average rate of +0.44% pa, 1990-2013. The OECD
harmonised deﬂator for Spain, for the same period, falls at an average rate of -3.54% pa.
4 In forming price indices for computers and peripheral equipment, semiconductors and software, the US Bureau of Economic
Analysis employ a hedonic approach to separate out the components of price changes that are due to improvements in product
characteristics. See for example Moulton (2001).
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apply to other countries. The same method is also used in generating harmonised deﬂators for IT hardware
and also software. We also produce our own harmonised price indices for ICT assets, setting the ratio of
the price of ICT investment to the implied price of value-added in each country equal to the ratio in the
US, thus adjusting the price of ICT for diﬀerences in general inﬂation between countries. For each set of
deﬂators, we produce international growth-accounting results and test the impact of the deﬂator on each of
the ICT parameters.
The rest of this paper is set out as follows. Section 2 sets out the framework. Section 3 describes features
of our dataset and its construction. Section 4 presents our results and ﬁnally, section 5 concludes.
2 Framework and existing literature
In this paper we conduct a sources of growth decomposition for fourteen OECD economies: the US, and
thirteen European countries.5 The underlying model applied to each country is set out below.
2.1 Model
First we set out a sources-of-growth relation for each country. GDP in each economy grows as:
∆ lnQt≡sLQ∆ lnLt + sKQ∆ lnKt + ∆ lnTFPt (1)
Where Q is real whole economy value-added, L are labour services,6 K are capital services and total factor
productivity (TFP) is deﬁned as a residual. Alternatively we can set the relation out in per hour terms, as:
∆ ln(Q/H)t = s
L
Q∆ ln(L/H)t + s
K
Q∆ ln(K/H)t + ∆ lnTFPt (2)
Where H are annual person-hours worked. In equations (1) and (2), s is an income share for each factor
input X, estimated as an average over the two periods (we omit the usual overbar just to ease notation):
sLQ ≡
1
2
((
PLL
PQQ
)
t
+
(
PLL
PQQ
)
t−1
)
(3)
and
sKQ ≡
1
2
((
PKK
PQQ
)
t
+
(
PKK
PQQ
)
t−1
)
(4)
Where PL, PK and PQ are the prices of labour, capital and value-added, respectively. In equations (1) and
(2), capital and labour services are translog aggregations over heterogeneous capital types aa and labour
types b respectively:
∆lnL =
∑
sLbL ∆lnHb,t (5)
5 Those countries are: Austria (AUT); Belgium (BEL); Denmark (DNK); Spain (ESP); Finland (FIN); France (FRA); Germany
(GER); Ireland (IRL); Italy (ITA); the Netherlands (NLD); Portugal (PRT); Sweden (SWE); and the United Kingdom (UK).
6 Where labour services are a measure of labour input adjusted for the composition of the workforce, with growth in the hours
worked of diﬀerent composition groups weighted with that groups share of the total wagebill. Thus labour services consist
of volume (i.e. hours worked), with an adjustment for the quality, or more accurately, composition, of the workforce. For
more on measurement of labour services, see section 3.5.
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and
∆lnK =
∑
sKaaK ∆lnKaa,t (6)
where Hb are the annual person-hours worked by type b workers and the shares here are shares of total
capital and labour payments for each type, again averaged over the current and previous period in order to
form a superlative index:
sLbL ≡
1
2
((
PLbLb
PLL
)
t
+
(
PLbLb
PLL
)
t−1
)
(7)
and
sKaaK ≡
1
2
((
PKaaKaa
PKK
)
t
+
(
PKaaKaa
PKK
)
t−1
)
(8)
Labour is in natural units, hours. For capital, we have nominal capital investment in asset type aa and
a price index for investment goods of each type. Thus we build capital stocks of type aa by a perpetual
inventory model so that for Kaa we have:
Kaa,t =
P ∗IaaIaa
PIaa
+ (1− δKaa)Kaa,t−1 (9)
Where δKaa is an asset-speciﬁc depreciation rate and note that P ∗I , the true price of investment in asset aa,
may diﬀer from the measured price of investment, PI . The inputs side of the model is completed by the
user-cost relation between PI and PK :
PKaa = PIaa(ρ+ δ
Kaa − (∆PIaa/PIaa)) (10)
Where ρ is an economy-wide nominal net rate of return and ∆PIaa/PIaa is the capital gain/loss that results
from holding the asset.7 Finally we have the output side of the model where growth in value added is deﬁned
by GDP as:8
∆lnQ ≡ sPcCQ ∆lnC + ΣsIaaQ ∆lnIaa (11)
From (11) it is clear that faster growth in Iaa, due to slower growth (or faster decline) in PIaa, will result
in stronger growth in ∆lnQ, thus making clear that adjusting measurement of PIaa changes both input and
output.
2.1.1 Aggregation
In our analysis, as well as presenting data for individual countries, we also work with country groups e.g. All
Countries, EU-13, US, Scandinavia, Large Northern European Economies, Small Open Northern European
Economies and Southern Europe. (See Table 1 for a complete list of the countries and country groups in our
data.) The relation between individual countries and higher-level aggregates is as follows. Real GDP in the
aggregate (synthetic) country group grows as in (1) but where the shares for K and L are shares in aggregate
7 Due to incomplete data across countries, in this paper we do not apply tax adjustment factors to the estimation of user costs.
8 Where government consumption and investment are subsumed into C and I respectively, and we omit international trade for
simplicity.
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value-added for the country group. Or put another way, all components of (1) can be aggregated as a share
weighted sum, where the weights are that country's share in the nominal value-added of the country group:9
∆ lnQAGGt = s
QsLQ∆ lnLt + s
QsKQ∆ lnKt + s
Q∆ lnTFPt (12)
sQ ≡ 1
2
((
PQQ
PQQAGG
)
t
+
(
PQQ
PQQAGG
)
t−1
)
(13)
2.2 Existing literature
How does this paper relate to others? Van Ark and Inklaar (2005) study the contribution of ICT across
countries using the EUKLEMS dataset, which includes harmonised price indices for IT equipment for coun-
tries that do not make an adjustment for quality change, but does not include harmonised constant-quality
price indices for CT equipment or software (O'Mahony and Timmer, 2009). Oulton (2002) and Jorgenson
(2001) also conduct growth-accounting for the UK and US respectively, with a focus on the contribution of
aggregate ICT equipment and also software.
Our paper is also related to van Ark et al. (2008), who study the productivity gap between Europe
and the US, contrasting the speed-up in the US with the slowdown in Europe, which they party attribute
to lower contributions from ICT production but also from ICT capital accumulation, particularly in the
market services sector. However, they attribute most of the diﬀerence in the US-EU performance to lower
growth in TFP, which they suggest may partly be due to lower ICT capital deepening, possibly due to
a lower contribution from complementary, but unmeasured, intangible capital, thus inhibiting innovation.
Jorgenson et al. (2008) also note the acceleration in US TFP in the late 1990s, and the subsequent slowdown
post-2004. This acceleration started in the ICT-producing industries and, as ICT prices fell, was also clearly
evident in industries that use ICT intensively. Jorgenson et al. (2003) conclude that ICT capital deepening
and ICT-induced TFP growth explain over three-quarters of the US productivity acceleration in the late
1990s. Similarly, Oliner and Sichel (2000) estimate that almost all of the US productivity acceleration can
be explained by ICT.
In a series of papers, Brynjolfsson, Hitt and Yang (e.g. Brynjolfsson and Hitt (2003)) measure the ICT
contribution using ﬁrm-level data. They estimate that the full beneﬁts of ICT investment accrue with lags
of ﬁve to seven years, which they conclude either reﬂects ICT externalities taking time to transmit, or the
need to invest in complementary intangible capital, particularly organisational capital, in order to reap the
full productivity beneﬁts of ICT investments. Gordon (2016) argues however that the beneﬁts of ICT are
more evolutionary and pale in comparison to those of other revolutionary and more consequential inventions
and innovations over the past century, such as those in electricity, lighting, indoor heating and plumbing,
construction, healthcare, transport and early communications technology, which cannot be repeated.
More speciﬁcally, on CT and its treatment as a distinct asset separate from IT hardware, Doms (2005),
Corrado (2011a) and Byrne and Corrado (2009) form new estimates of price change for CT equipment but
do not conduct growth-accounting. Schreyer and Colecchia (2002) construct harmonised deﬂators for ICT
(IT, CT and software) assets, using price diﬀerentials with non-ICT investment prices in the US. We also
apply these deﬂators in our own growth decompositions; data and methods are set out below. They ﬁnd
that applying their harmonised indices raises growth rates in real ICT investment and ICT capital services
9 Where, in the aggregation, country nominal value-added is converted to USD using purchasing power parities (PPPs) and
aggregate value-added is a sum of PPP-adjusted country nominal value-added (in USD).
7
in countries that do (did) not control for quality change in estimating ICT prices. Jalava and Pohjola (2008)
use US price data for IT and CT equipment to re-estimate the ICT contribution to growth in Finland.
3 Data
The dataset constructed for this paper was primarily built using country-level total economy data downloaded
from OECD.Stat, which contains national accounts data submitted to the OECD from the national statistical
institutes (NSIs) of member countries. Where data were incomplete or missing, the data were supplemented
with other sources, with some extrapolation or imputation where necessary. All extrapolations or imputations
are documented below.
3.1 Time period
For most countries, our data run from 1990 to 2013. However, for some countries the data start later. We
therefore conduct all analysis over the period 1995-2013, so that all larger countries are included for that
period. For some countries (namely Belgium (1999), Denmark (1999), Ireland (1999), Portugal (1999) and
Sweden (1997)) the data begin later than 1995 so results for the period 1995-2000 are missing for those
countries. The years for which our data are suﬃciently complete to conduct our growth-accounting analyses
are set out in Table 1, by country.
3.2 Countries
Table 1 shows the countries in our dataset (column 1), along with the ﬁrst and last years for which we are
able to carry out our growth-accounting analysis (columns 2 and 3), and with details of speciﬁc adjustments
made to individual countries to ﬁll in missing data (column 4). Notes on more general adjustments that
apply to all countries are presented below. In our analysis, we present results for individual countries and
also each of the country groups listed, as well as the EU-13 and All countries.
In addition to the country-speciﬁc adjustments set out above, the following adjustments apply to all
countries. The latest revision to the SNA (UnitedNations, 2008) incorporates cultivated and biological assets
as capital.10 However, data on GFCF in this asset category is missing for many countries in the OECD.Stat
data, including the US. We therefore exclude this asset from our productivity decomposition. GFCF in
mineral exploration and artistic originals (or copyrights) is not presented separately in the OECD.Stat data.
It is therefore backed out as a residual, as total GFCF in intellectual property products (IPPs) less GFCF
in R&D and software. For all countries, missing data on GFCF in IPP assets were ﬁlled in making use of
the IPP total and calculating other assets as a residual, including if necessary, using the share of GFCF in
a particular asset in previous years and the IPP total to impute estimates for missing years. Where data
for mineral exploration and artistic originals remained missing, these were ﬁlled in using data from either
Intan-Invest (Corrado et al., 2012)or EUKLEMS (O'Mahony and Timmer, 2009). Note, data from Intan-
Invest are for the market sector, so we necessarily assume that the market sector makes all investments in
these two asset types, as opposed to any government investment.
In the OECD.Stat data, ICT equipment is deﬁned as the aggregate of IT hardware and CT equipment and
so does not include software. Where data on GFCF in IT or CT are missing, data are either estimated as a
10Cultivated assets are a new asset category introduced into the System of National Accounts (SNA) in the 2008 revision. They
include livestock and plantations that yield repeat products.
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Table 1: Countries in data and notes on data compliation
Country First
year
Last
year
Notes
Northern Europe
(large)
France (FRA) 1990 2013
Germany (GER) 1995 2013 Split of ICT Gross Fixed Capital Formation (GFCF) into CT and IT equipment estimated using EUKLEMS (for data pre-2007) and
information on the share of ICT GFCF in GDP from OECD Science, Technology and Industry Scoreboard (for post-2007). ICT (IT and
CT, or aggregate ICT equipment) deﬂators not available from OECD.Stat for Germany. Therefore IT and CT price indices from EUKLEMS
are used instead (up to 2007), and extended to 2013 using prices changes for the Netherlands for the same respective index.
UK (UK) 1990 2013 Alternative source of nominal CT investment based on Goodridge et al. (2013b) (GHW), and extrapolated forward and backward using
growth rate in oﬃcial NSI estimates of nominal CT GFCF.
Northern Europe
(small)
Austria (AUT) 1990 2013
Belgium (BEL) 1999 2013
Ireland (IRL) 1999 2013
Netherlands (NLD) 1990 2013
Southern Europe
Italy (ITA) 1990 2013 GFCF in R&D in 2014 imputed using share of R&D in total GFCF in IPPs in 2013.
Portugal (PRT) 1999 2013 OECD ICT harmonised deﬂators are only available up to 2011 for Portugal. Extended to 2013 using corresponding price changes in Spain
for 2012-13. GFCF in software in 2011-13 imputed using the share of software GFCF in total GFCF in IPPs in 2010.
Spain (ESP) 1990 2013 GFCF in R&D in 2013 imputed using share of R&D GFCF in total GFCF in IPPs in 2012. Separate national deﬂators for GFCF in IT and
CT equipment are not available from OECD.Stat, therefore aggregate deﬂator for ICT equipment is applied to each.
Scandinavia
Denmark (DNK) 1999 2013 GFCF in software in 2014 imputed using share of software GFCF in total GFCF in IPPs in 2013. Separate national deﬂators for GFCF in
IT and CT equipment are not available from OECD.Stat, therefore aggregate deﬂator for ICT equipment is applied to each.
Finland (FIN) 1990 2013
Sweden (SWE) 1997 2013 Nominal GFCF and GFCF price indices extended using corresponding data downloaded from Statistics Sweden, including a break out of
GFCF in ICT equipment into IT and CT. Separate national deﬂators for GFCF in IT and CT equipment derived from estimates of real and
nominal investment from Statistics Sweden.
USA (US) 1990 2013 GFCF in individual IPP assets (and associated price indices) downloaded directly from BEA. GFCF data for other assets backcast using
BEA data.
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residual using total GFCF in ICT equipment, or imputed using the estimate of total GFCF in ICT equipment
and a moving average of the component share for either IT or CT. Where ICT (or IT/CT) remains missing,
we use the ratio implied in the EUKLEMS data to extrapolate and/or impute. In the case of Germany, a
split of ICT GFCF into IT and CT equipment is unavailable in the oﬃcial data. Therefore, for this country,
pre-2007 GFCF in IT and CT equipment is taken from EUKLEMS. Post-2007 data are imputed using ICT
GFCF as a share of GDP in 2013, taken from the OECD Science, Technology and Industry Scoreboard 2015
(OECD, 2015), changes in gross value-added, and the share of CT GFCF in ICT equipment. Similarly for
other assets/countries, for years where GFCF data are missing, data are imputed using the proﬁle of the
same respective series in EUKLEMS. Where data on GFCF in R&D are missing, data are extrapolated or
imputed using cross-country data on Gross Expenditure on R&D (GERD), downloaded from the OECD.
Imputed data make use of the ratio between R&D GFCF and GERD in countries where both series' are
available.
The GFCF price index for each asset, and the value-added price index, are derived implicitly using
constant and current price data, and the price index re-referenced to 2005=1. Nominal GFCF and the
price index are then extrapolated using data from EUKLEMS when available, and the constant price series'
are re-estimated using the re-referenced price index. To deﬂate GFCF in mineral exploration and artistic
originals, we apply the aggregate price index for IPPs. Where national price indices for either software are
missing or unavailable, we either apply the aggregate price index for IPPs, or extend the asset price index
using the aggregate price index for IPPs. To deﬂate GFCF in R&D, we use the gross value-added price index
for each country.
For capital stock initial values, where we have estimates from EUKLEMS, the initial value (re-based to
2005 prices) from EUKLEMS is used. Where we have no information from EUKLEMS (e.g. as for R&D),
the initial value is estimated using the standard steady-state formula, Kt = It/(g + δ), where g is mean
growth in real investment and δ is the asset-speciﬁc depreciation rate.
For labour income, OECD/NSI data on compensation of employees do not include any element of labour
renumeration for the self-employed. We therefore take estimates of the labour income share directly from
the Total Economy Database (TED) produced by The Conference Board, and backcast it using the implied
labour income share from EUKLEMS, both of which do include an estimate of self-employed mixed income
that is a return to labour. Data on growth in annual hours worked are also taken from the TED, and
benchmarked to the level in the OECD.Stat data in 2013. Data on growth in labour services and therefore
labour composition are also taken directly from TED.
Data on gross value-added are backcast using EUKLEMS where available. When we switch between
alternative deﬂators for ICT assets, we make a corresponding adjustment to the value-added price index, so
that real gross value-added incorporates the change to real GFCF.
3.3 Output and Gross Fixed Capital Formation (GFCF)
For output, we use data from OECD.Stat on total economy nominal and real gross value added (GVA) at basic
prices. Data on nominal and real gross ﬁxed capital formation (GFCF) in intellectual property products
(IPPs, that is R&D, software, mineral exploration and artistic originals (GFCF in the latter two assets
are combined)), computer hardware (IT), telecommunications equipment (CT), other plant and machinery
(P&M or p), vehicles (v) and (non-residential) buildings (b) are also from OECD.Stat. We exclude GFCF
10
Figure 1: Cross-country investment in telecommunications equipment (CT) (US$ bns)
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Note to ﬁgure: Data on nominal GFCF in telecommunications equipment across fourteen countries (US and EU-13).
Vertical line in 2008 to mark the recession. Data in national currencies converted to USD billions using OECD PPPs.
in dwellings which are not capital in the context of productivity analysis.11All speciﬁc adjustments to ﬁll in
incomplete data are set out in and below Table 1. Where data for the US were missing, nominal GFCF in
R&D, mineral exploration and artistic originals were downloaded from the US BEA to replace or extend the
existing data. For Sweden, GFCF data were ﬁlled in and extended using data downloaded from Statistics
Sweden.
In Figure 1 below, we document nominal GFCF in CT capital equipment across countries. To ease
comparison, estimates are converted to US dollars (USD) using purchasing power parity (PPP) data down-
loaded from the OECD.12 As expected, nominal investment in CT capital is, by some distance, highest in
the US. In 2013, GFCF in CT equipment was $102.4bn in the US, followed by $11.7bn in Germany, $8.4bn
in Italy, $6.3bn in France, $4.1bn in Spain, $3.1bn in Austria, $2.6bn in Sweden, $2.4bn in Belgium, $1.6bn
in the UK, $1.2bn in the Netherlands, $1bn in Portugal, $0.5bn in Finland, $0.5bn in Ireland and $0.3bn in
Denmark.
11Strictly, for consistency, we should therefore also exclude the output of the real estate sector from GVA, since this is largely
made up of the actual and imputed rents (for owner-occupiers) of dwellings. However data on the output of the real estate
sector were not available for all countries. We therefore use total economy GVA including actual and imputed rents for each
country, but note this issue in our data and estimation.
12We apply a PPP for whole economy GDP. Strictly, for full accuracy we should apply a PPP speciﬁc to CT equipment.
However, we apply a whole economy PPP for illustrative purposes. Note all growth accounting estimations are conducted in
national currencies. Estimates for aggregated country groups use PPP-adjusted nominal value-added in the construction of
country shares or weights.
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Figure 2: Comparing UK investment in telecomunications equipment (CT) (¿bns)
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Note to ﬁgure: UK nominal GFCF in CT equipment according to oﬃcial ONS data (blue line), compared to estimates
in GHW (red line) and EUKLEMS (green line). GHW estimates extended forward from 2009 to 2013 using growth
rates in the latest oﬃcial data. Data in ¿bns. Vertical line in 2008 to mark the recession.
3.3.1 UK GFCF in communications equipment (CT)
UK data on nominal GFCF in CT equipment were taken from OECD.Stat, in turn from the UK national
accounts. We note that of the estimates presented above, the estimate for investment in CT equipment in
the UK is, by some distance, the smallest of all large, advanced European economies, and is considerably
lower than in a number of much smaller economies. Oﬃcial estimates for the UK are also in stark contrast
to estimates from our previous work(Goodridge et al., 2013b) (hereafter, GHW) and those in EUKLEMS
(both estimated using previous vintages of the Input-Output Supply and Use tables (SUTs)). A comparison
of oﬃcial UK estimates with those in GHW and EUKLEMS is presented below in Figure 2, with each series
in UK ¿ sterling. As is clear from the ﬁgure, the latest revised UK data do not incorporate the dramatic
run-up of investment in the late 1990s as observed in GHW, interpreted there as the creation of network
infrastructure, and also EUKLEMS. In comparison the oﬃcial series is ﬂat, with a clear level diﬀerence of
at least ¿2bn for most of the period concerned. In 2001, the peak of UK telecoms investment, the diﬀerence
between GHW and the latest oﬃcial estimates is as much as ¿5.6bn. The diﬀerence between EUKLEMS
and oﬃcial estimates is even greater. We therefore use estimates from GHW as an alternative series for
UK investment in CT, with estimates extrapolated forward (from 2009) using growth rates taken from the
oﬃcial series.
From Figure 1 we can see that for most countries, nominal investment in CT capital grew relatively
strongly in the late 1990s and/or early 2000s and has since slowed, or in some cases declined. In Figure 3 we
present indices of nominal investment (converted to USD using OECD PPPs and indexed) for the aggregate
of the fourteen countries in our dataset, for: tangible capital excluding ICT equipment (Tang excl ICT);
intangible capital as estimated in the national accounts (NA Intang, that is, software, mineral exploration,
artistic originals and R&D), IT hardware (IT), and communications equipment (CT). The index for
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Figure 3: Nominal investment, all countries (PPP US$), 2000=1
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Note to ﬁgure: Index of aggregate nominal GFCF (converted to USD using PPPs), by asset category, across
fourteen countries (US and EU-13), indexed to 2000=1. Vertical line in 2008 to mark the recession. Series' for GFCF
in tangible capital excluding ICT equipment (Tang excl ICT), GFCF in IT hardware equipment (IT), GFCF in
communications equipment (CT) and GFCF in national accounts intangibles (NA Intang).
investment in each asset group is set to 2000=1. Of the four asset types or groups, nominal GFCF in CT
grew most rapidly in the 1995-2000 period at a mean rate of 11.6% pa, compared to 8.7% pa for IT hardware,
6% pa for tangibles excluding ICT equipment and 8.9% pa for national accounts intangibles. However, after
2000, nominal GFCF in ICT equipment declined, with CT investment growing at -1.6% pa on average in
the pre-recession 2000-07 period and IT at -1.5% pa, compared to 4.9% pa for tangibles excluding ICT and
5.5% pa for national accounts intangibles. In the post-recession 2007-13 period, mean growth in nominal
GFCF in CT equipment has remained negative at -0.8% pa, as has growth in nominal IT investment at -1.4%
pa, compared with -0.4% pa for tangibles excluding ICT. Interestingly, nominal GFCF in intangibles has
continued to grow during and after the recession, at a rate of 3.4% pa. The relative strength of investment
in intangibles relative to tangibles during and since the recession is noted in Goodridge et al. (2013a).
Of course, although the nominal value of CT investment has been ﬂat or declining since around 2000 (in
terms of the all country aggregate used here), that does not mean that the real volume of CT investment has
remained ﬂat or declined. That depends on the price per unit of telecommunications investment, which in
turn depends partly upon the eﬃciency characteristic of CT goods and how that has changed over time. In
other words, ¿100 of telecoms investment in 2013 has considerably greater real volume (i.e. buys considerably
more) than ¿100 of telecoms investment in 2000. For instance, in the 1990s and early 2000s, investments
in ﬁbre optic cable and equipment increased network capacity by a factor of forty (Doms, 2005). Doms
(2005) also notes that the pace of progress in ﬁbre-optic capacity is well above that of Moore's Law, with
capacity doubling every year between 1996 and 2001. Clearly an appropriate price index must take this pace
of change into account. The question of the most appropriate price index to apply to telecommunications
13
investment is addressed below.
3.4 Prices
For the price of value-added and GFCF, our national price indices are derived implicitly using current and
constant price data. Since diﬀerent countries have diﬀerent base years in the OECD.Stat data, all price
indices are re-referenced to 2005=1, and all constant price series' are re-estimated using the re-referenced
price index. Where data for the US were missing, GFCF price indices were downloaded directly from the
BEA. For Sweden, GFCF price indices were extended using data downloaded from Statistics Sweden.
As noted above, the key lesson learned from research into the contribution of ICT equipment to growth,
is that accurate measurement of real ICT investment and growth in ICT capital services required use of
hedonic or quality-adjusted deﬂators (see for example Triplett (2004)). In cases where national practice is
to not develop country-speciﬁc quality-adjusted deﬂators, researchers (or in some cases, NSIs) have favoured
the use of the US BEA hedonic index or some version adjusted for application to that country, or sets of
harmonised deﬂators across countries, such as those in EUKLEMS for instance (Timmer et al., 2007). This
way measures of changes in ICT prices reﬂect improvements in power and other characteristics, as well as
falls in listed prices, and thus measures of real ICT investment and capital services reﬂect changes in the
real quantity of capital available for production.
For ICT assets, including software, we work with three sets of alternative deﬂators. First, as a benchmark,
we apply the (implied) deﬂators submitted to the OECD by NSIs. Obviously national practice in the
measurement of the price of CT equipment (and indeed other aspects of ICT investment) varies across
countries, and so results and comparisons based on these national deﬂators are aﬀected by that. Second, we
have harmonised deﬂators for each ICT asset (IT, CT and software), produced by the OECD (Schreyer and
Colecchia, 2002). The method for harmonisation involves taking the ratio of ICT to non-ICT asset prices in
the US and applying that ratio to other countries. Or in terms of the log change, the log change in the ICT
price index for the chosen country is estimated as the log change in the US price index, less the log change
in the US non-ICT price index, plus the log change in the non-ICT price index in the chosen country, as set
out in equation (14).
∆lnP iICTc,t = ∆lnP i
ICT
US,t −∆lnP iNON−ICTUS,t + ∆lnP iNON−ICTc,t (14)
Third, we produce our own set of harmonised deﬂators, again based on US ICT GFCF price indices, but
adjusting for relative inﬂation according to changes in the price of value-added in the US and the relevant
country, rather than changes in the price of non-ICT assets, as set out in equation (15).
∆lnP iICTc,t = ∆lnP i
ICT
US,t −∆lnPqUS,t + ∆lnPqc,t (15)
In our estimation, when switching between alternative deﬂators for GFCF, we adjust the GVA deﬂator to
account for this, so that GVA prices are consistent with GFCF prices, and real GDP is therefore consistent
with real GFCF.
It might be argued that use of the US price index, either in original or adjusted/harmonised form, for other
countries is not appropriate if those countries face diﬀerent prices or if the composition of telecommunications
investment diﬀers across countries. However, ﬁrst, as noted in Corrado (2011b), the pattern and proﬁle of
price changes in CT equipment is remarkably similar across a diverse range of technologies, products and
varieties. Second, these are internationally traded products and so we would expect them to be priced
14
Figure 4: Price indices for GFCF in CT equipment, by country (2005=1), 1990-2013
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Note to ﬁgure: Chart comparing three sets of deﬂators for CT equipment, by country, 1990-2013: 1) national deﬂator
from NSI data (blue line); 2) OECD harmonised deﬂator (red line); 3) GHE harmonised deﬂator (green line). Y-axis
is a log scale. 2005=1, marked with vertical and horizontal line. Note, national CT deﬂator not available for Germany,
instead it is are taken from EUKLEMS (up to 2007) and extended to 2013 using changes in the national deﬂator for
the Netherlands. Separate national deﬂators for CT equipment are not available for Denmark or Spain, therefore, for
each, the national deﬂator for aggregate ICT equipment is used instead.
competitively across countries. And third, the use of US ICT price indices has become accepted research
practice, and in some cases these indices are also applied by NSIs in national measurement.13
The following charts present the price indices in our dataset for each ICT asset, and compare national
deﬂators 14 with harmonised deﬂators produced by the OECD, and our own version of harmonised deﬂators
produced for this paper (GHE). First, Figure 4 compares the three sets of deﬂators for CT equipment, by
country, over the period 1990 to 2013.
Figure 4 shows considerable diﬀerences in the proﬁle of CT deﬂators between countries. First, we note
that the two versions of harmonised deﬂators (OECD (red) and GHE (green)) produce similar proﬁles, with
the OECD version generally being slightly more aggressive, with slightly faster price declines particularly
toward the end of the series'. In turn, the harmonised deﬂators are typically more aggressive than the
13UK estimates of capital services produced by the ONS make use of (exchange rate or PPP adjusted versions) of US price
indices for IT hardware and pre-packaged software.
14Details of any imputation or interpolation for national price indices are provided in or below Table 1.
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national deﬂators (blue). The proﬁle of national CT deﬂators however diﬀers considerably across countries.
We note in particular that national price indices in Austria, Spain, France, Ireland, Italy and the Netherlands
are relatively ﬂat and show little sign of fast falls in the price of CT equipment, with some indices exhibiting
rising prices. Note, in the case of Spain, this is not limited to CT prices, with the deﬂator presented here being
for the aggregate for ICT equipment and so includes the price of IT hardware, which is an unusual result.
National deﬂators for other countries are generally more aggressive, in particular, for Denmark, Portugal,
Sweden and the UK, and also but to a lesser extent, Germany. For Denmark, we note that separate national
deﬂators for CT and IT equipment were not available, so the price index presented here is for aggregate ICT
equipment and so incorporates the well-documented declines in the price of IT hardware. For Portugal, the
CT price index is less aggressive than the harmonised deﬂators in the late 1990s, but exhibits faster falling
prices than either version of the harmonised deﬂators in recent years prior to 2013. For the UK, the national
price index falls at a faster rate than either version of the harmonised deﬂators, particularly in the 1990s
and less so in more recent years. For Germany, the price index presented here is taken from EUKLEMS.
The national price indices for Belgium, Spain, Finland, France, Ireland, Italy and the Netherlands each
have some unusual features. The index for Belgium exhibits price falls pre-2005, but price rises after. As
noted above, the index for Spain, an ICT equipment price index, shows rising prices, with only some evidence
of price falls for later years. The indices for Finland, Italy and the Netherlands are relatively ﬂat pre-2005,
but exhibit stronger price declines thereafter, and in the case of Finland, declines which are even stronger
than those in the harmonised indices based on US data. The index for France is also relatively ﬂat throughout
the period, with some gentle price falls. Finally, the index for Ireland is also ﬂat prior to 2005, before falling
aggressively at a rate in line with the harmonised indices, and then starting to rise such that it diverges
strongly from the harmonised price indices.
In Figure 5 we conduct the same exercise but this time comparing deﬂators for IT hardware equipment.
First, we note that in the case of IT equipment there seems to be a larger degree of consistency across
countries, although again there are some countries for which the IT price index looks unusual in comparison
to either of the harmonised deﬂators. For instance, the IT price index for Austria falls quite rapidly in the
early 1990s before slowing and having a relatively ﬂat proﬁle for the rest of the period. For Belgium, the
price index is almost ﬂat throughout. For Denmark, the price index falls, although at a slower rate than
the harmonised indices, and for Spain the index is ﬂat in comparison to the harmonised deﬂators. Note, for
Denmark and Spain, the IT price index presented here is actually a price index for aggregate ICT equipment
(IT & CT) as separate national indices for IT and CT were not available. For Finland, the price index is
quite aggressive, falling at a comparable rate to the harmonised deﬂators. For France, the index falls gently
in the 1990s and early 2000s, and then at a rate more comparable to the harmonised indices post-2005. For
Germany, the index is similar to the harmonised deﬂators, although note, this is also a harmonised (IT)
deﬂator from EUKLEMS, as national ICT deﬂators for Germany were not available in the oﬃcial data. For
Ireland, the IT price index has a similar pattern to the CT price index. IT prices fall in the late 1990s,
although at a slower rate than in the harmonised indices, before diverging and rising in the post-2005 period.
For Italy, the price index exhibits price falls in the early 1990s, but is ﬂat thereafter. For the Netherlands,
price falls according to the national index are very similar to those according to the harmonised deﬂators.
For Portugal, the IT index declines very slowly in the late 1990s, with faster falls post-2005, at a rate similar
to those implied by the harmonised indices. Similarly for Sweden, which shows price falls slower than the
harmonised deﬂators pre-2005, but slightly faster price falls than the harmonised indices post-2005. Finally,
the national IT price index for the UK is shown to be quite aggressive throughout the period studied,
16
Figure 5: Price indices for GFCF in IT equipment, by country (2005=1), 1990-2013
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Note to ﬁgure: Chart comparing three sets of deﬂators for IT equipment, by country, 1990-2013: 1) national deﬂator
from NSI data (blue line); 2) OECD harmonised deﬂator (red line); 3) GHE harmonised deﬂator (green line). Y-axis
is a log scale. 2005=1, marked with vertical and horizontal line. Note, national IT deﬂator not available for Germany,
instead it is taken from EUKLEMS (up to 2007) and extended to 2013 using changes in the national deﬂator for the
Netherlands. Separate national deﬂators for IT equipment are not available for Denmark or Spain, therefore for each
the national deﬂator for aggregate ICT equipment is used instead.
although with smaller price falls than implied by the harmonised indices.
Finally, in Figure 6 we compare national measures of software investment prices with each version of the
harmonised deﬂators. Here, we see that in a numerous cases, national software GFCF price indices diﬀer
considerably to the harmonised versions based on the US deﬂator, with the exceptions of Germany and the
UK. The US, and hence the harmonised, deﬂators, generally fall throughout the 1990s before levelling oﬀ
and remaining quite ﬂat in the late 2000s. In contrast, for a number of countries the national software
GFCF price index tends to rise. For Austria, software prices rise and fall but remain fairly ﬂat in the 1990s
before gradually rising in the post-2005 period. For Belgium, the pattern is one of price growth in the late
1990s before sharp falls in the early 2000s and then steady price growth after 2005. For Denmark and Spain,
software prices rise steadily throughout the period. For Finland, the national index is either falling or ﬂat
in the 1990s and early 2000s, before rising steadily post-2005. For France, prices rise slowly throughout the
period studied. In contrast, the price index for Germany declines throughout the 1990s and early 2000s,
before leveling oﬀ in the late 2000s. The resulting index is very similar to each of the harmonised deﬂators.
17
Figure 6: Price indices for GFCF in software, by country (2005=1), 1990-2013
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Note to ﬁgure: Chart comparing three sets of deﬂators for software, by country, 1990-2013: 1) national deﬂator
from NSI data (blue line); 2) OECD harmonised deﬂator (red line); 3) GHE harmonised deﬂator (green line). Y-axis
is a log scale. 2005=1, marked with vertical and horizontal line. National software deﬂators backcast using software
deﬂators from EUKLEMS where available to extend the series.
In Ireland and Italy, software prices are estimated to have grown steadily throughout the period studied.
For the Netherlands, the national price index falls in the late 1990s, before rising for most of the 2000s and
then starting to fall again toward the end of the period. For Portugal, the national index rises strongly in
the late 1990s and early 2000s before leveling oﬀ and starting to fall in the late 2000s. Data for Sweden
show strong price growth throughout the 1990s, but after 2005 the index levels oﬀ and behaves much more
similarly to the harmonised indices. Finally, the series for the UK is quite similar to the harmonised indices,
with slightly larger price declines than the GHE version, and slightly smaller price declines than the OECD
version.15
In practice, national measurement of software prices also partly reﬂects the composition of software
investment in each country. Measured software GFCF has three components: pre-packaged; custom and
own-account, where the latter is an estimate of software development that takes place and is used in-house
and is not intended for ﬁnal sale. Generally, the price of the latter component, own-account, is estimated
using a wage index for software programmers, and in the case of the UK, with a small adjustment for assumed
15Oﬃcial UK NSI data for the price of software, downloaded from OECD.Stat, begin in 1997 and are extrapolated back using
the software price changes in EUKLEMS. The large price change in 1990-1 is therefore from the EUKLEMS data.
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productivity growth in the writing of software.16 Custom software is an element of purchased software but it
is typically assumed that its price is more likely to move similarly to that of own-account, and so a number
of countries (e.g. the US and UK) apply the own-account index to deﬂate this aspect of software GFCF.
Finally, there is pre-packaged software, the price of which can be observed, and in the case of the US pre-
packaged index, adjusted for changes in quality/volume using hedonic methods. The UK Oﬃce for National
Statistics (ONS) makes use of the US pre-packaged index in its measurement of purchased software.
3.5 Labour input
On labour income, the share of labour payments in GVA is taken directly from the Total Economy Database
(TED) produced by The Conference Board, the reason being that OECD/NSI data on Compensation of
Employees do not include any element of the mixed income earned by the self-employed. The TED data
on labour shares do however include an estimate of the labour renumeration (from within mixed income)
earned by the self-employed, as does EUKLEMS, which we use to backcast the TED labour share.
For consistency, and to incorporate data on growth in labour services and therefore labour composition,
all labour input data are taken from the TED, with growth in annual person-hours worked benchmarked in
levels to OECD/NSI data in 2013. As the paper sets out, we can express changes in labour services as the
sum of two terms:
∆lnL = ∆ln(LQH) + ∆lnH (16)
where H is total annual person-hours worked and LQH adjusts hours by the eﬀectiveness of each hour (i.e.,
L = H∗LQH). The term LQH is often referred to as labour quality or more correctly, labour composition
(in the EUKLEMS dataset for example, this is LAB_QPH, labour services per hour worked) and its
increase (multiplied by labour's share in income) is the direct channel whereby human capital accumulation
contributes to economic growth. Suppose for example there are skilled and unskilled workers, then we can
write this as:
∆lnL =
WUHU
ΣWH
∆lnHU +
WSHS
ΣWH
∆lnHS (17)
∆ln(L/H) =
WUHU
ΣWH
∆lnHU +
WSHS
ΣWH
∆lnHS −∆lnH (18)
Both returns to learning-by-doing (via experience and thus higher wages) and to schooling (again through
higher wages) are embedded in this term.17 If labour types are paid their marginal products then this index
(times the labour share) captures entirely the per hour contribution of skill changes and hence does not
aﬀect TFP (since TFP is calculated by subtracting oﬀ this from output growth). The capital per hour
terms are analogous: growth in diﬀerent capital types per hour, weighted by their rental shares, giving
16Note, even with an adjustment for productivity growth, the use of this method to estimate unobserved prices is particularly
uncertain. If markets are competitive, wages are likely to move with productivity. Note that, although in this example
there is a productivity adjustment, the wage data are for software writers and the productivity growth estimate used in
the adjustment is for the wider service sector. Therefore the adjustment made likely does not well reﬂect productivity in
software-writing. However, as noted, it is not possible to observe the true price of own-account software, and in such instances
it has become accepted practice to proxy output prices based on changes in the price of inputs, predominantly labour. The
same method is typically applied to estimating R&D prices, as in the UK for instance.
17Types of workers are typically deﬁned according to their diﬀering characteristics, usually in terms of education (qualiﬁcations)
and experience (age and gender). For our measure of ∆lnL we use data from The Conference Board Total Economy Database
(TED) which aggregates changes in hours worked for three worker types: low-skilled; medium-skilled and high-skilled. Skill
groups are deﬁned according to whether workers have undergone no schooling, primary, secondary or tertiary education
(de Vries and Azeez Erumban, 2015).
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Table 2: Capital assets
Asset Depreciation rate (δ) Deﬂator
Tangible
(Non-residential) Buildings 0.025 national
Vehicles 0.25 national
Computer hardware (IT) 0.4 1) national; 2) OECD harmonised; 3) GHE harmonised
Communications equipment (CT) 0.115 1) national; 2) OECD harmonised; 3) GHE harmonised
Plant & Machinery 0.13 national
Intangible
Software 0.33 1) national; 2) OECD harmonised; 3) GHE harmonised
R&D 0.15 implied national gross value-added deﬂator
Mineral Exploration & Artistic Originals 0.2 national (for IPPs)
Notes to table: In column 3, Deﬂator: national refers to the implied deﬂator in the OECD/NSI source data; OECD
harmonised refers to the OECD harmonised ICT deﬂators, estimated as set out in equation (14); and GHE harmonised refers
to our own version of harmonised deﬂators, estimated as set out in equation (15).
composition-adjusted growth in total capital services per hour.
3.6 Capital input
Table 2 sets out our capital inputs. For each asset, tangible and intangible, we deﬂate nominal GFCF using
an asset-speciﬁc deﬂator and construct capital stocks using the perpetual inventory method (PIM) as set
out in equation (9). The geometric rates of depreciation (deterioration) used for each asset are set out in
column 2.18
For initial values of asset capital stocks, we take estimates from EUKLEMS for the earliest year available,
re-based to 2005 prices. Where EUKLEMS data are not available, initial values are imputed using the steady-
state formula:19
Kaa,t = Iaa,t/(gaa + δaa) (19)
Where g is mean growth in real investment, I.
Growth in capital services by country is thus estimated as share-weighted growth in capital services from
diﬀerent assets, as in equation (6), where the shares are asset user costs as a share of total economy gross
operating surplus as in equation (8), and ρ is estimated ex-post such that user costs exhaust total gross
operating surplus.
On the primary subject of this paper, namely communications equipment, we note that measurement
issues may exist in cases where diﬀerent aspects of ICT are bundled in the same purchase. In the case of
hardware, we note that the international convention is that where software is bundled with hardware, and
the values cannot be separated, then the investment transaction is recorded in hardware. We assume that
the same applies to communications equipment, and that where software is bundled with CT and the values
18Strictly speaking, the rate of depreciation is a value concept based on the age-price proﬁle that is used to calculate the user
cost of capital, whilst the rate of deterioration is an eﬃciency or quantity concept based on the age-eﬃciency proﬁle, and is
used in the calculation of the PIM. In the special case of geometric rates, the two are identical. For reasons of consistency,
for each asset we apply the same geometric depreciation rate in all countries, although we note that within asset types the
composition of investment may diﬀer across countries, meaning that in some cases country-asset-speciﬁc rates may be more
appropriate. This issue is also discussed in Schreyer et al. (2003).
19The steady-state is a long-run state of economic equilibrium, where the economy grows at a constant growth rate, g, with a
constant saving rate. Thus, real investment grows at the same rate (g) such that the capital-output ratio is constant.
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cannot be separated, then the transaction is recorded in CT. Where CT is bundled with IT, we assume the
transaction is recorded under IT hardware. However, we note the potential for practice to vary by country,
with diﬀerent countries potentially applying diﬀerent methods and varying degrees of eﬀort in unbundling
various aspects of ICT investment.
On intangible (or knowledge) capital, we note that national statistical practice again varies. Regarding
R&D, practice in the EU and US diverges. In the United States, all forms of social, demographic, and actu-
arial research, as well as artiﬁcial intelligence, management science, and geophysical research were explicitly
excluded from the expenditures collected via R&D surveys until 2008. The basis shifted in that year to the
same basis used for R&D in company reports, but an instruction to exclude market research remains.
Regarding databases, SNA 1993 (UnitedNations, 1993) recommended capitalizing investments in databases
(along with software). The OECD Handbook on Deriving Capital Measures of Intellectual Property Prod-
ucts (OECD, 2010) reports that a survey of OECD member countries found that 8 of the 13 countries who
responded to the survey capitalized databases in principle, but that the values were not separately identiﬁ-
able (Ahmad, 2004). In separate work for the UK, Goodridge and Haskel (2015;2015b;2015a;2016) estimate
UK market sector investment in the building/transformation and analysis of data, and estimate that around
3/4 of such investments are already captured in the oﬃcial measurement of software in the UK.
4 Results
In this section we set out our growth-accounting results, for individual countries, country groups, the EU-13
and the aggregate of the fourteen countries in our dataset. We conduct three separate growth-accounting
exercises, one for each of our three sets of ICT deﬂators (i.e. national deﬂators, OECD harmonised deﬂators
and GHE harmonised deﬂators). This way we not only set out the contribution of diﬀerent types of ICT
capital to growth, with a focus on CT equipment, but we also shed light on how much of the variation in
contributions is explained by diﬀering estimates of price change. Detailed tables of growth-accounting results
using each set of deﬂators are set out in Tables 4, 5 and 6 in Appendix A. We present results for countries
and country groups for periods: 1995-00; 2000-07; 2007-10; and 2010-13.
The ﬁrst period covers the late 1990s which, in the UK at least, was a period characterised by high
productivity growth and a boom in ICT, and also intangible, investment (Borgo et al., 2013).20 The second
period gives data for the 2000s prior to the onset of the ﬁnancial crisis, which for most countries saw
a slowdown in productivity growth and also a slowdown in the contribution of ICT. The third period
includes the Great Recession, thus productivity measures are typically negative due to the collapse in labour
productivity and TFP that occurred in most countries. We therefore choose to consider this period separately.
The ﬁnal period covers the post-recession years, in most countries characterised by continued weakness in
productivity growth.
We note that it is usual for growth-accounting to be conducted over chosen periods according to points
in the business cycle. This way, endpoints are chosen such that results are less aﬀected by diﬀerences in
factor utilisation at diﬀerent points in the cycle. However, here we work with data for a number of countries,
meaning that the chosen periods coincide with diﬀerent points in the business cycle for diﬀerent countries.
Thus comparisons between countries may be somewhat aﬀected by this.
Although of course the data vary by country, for (the share-weighted aggregate of) all countries, the
20Although we note that the boom in ICT investment in the UK in the late 1990s, observed in previous papers, has largely
been revised away in successive revisions to ONS GFCF data.
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labour productivity record is one of strong growth in the late 1990s, softening in the 2000s and culminating
in weak labour productivity growth in the latest period(s). Of the country groups, the exception to this
pattern is Southern Europe, which has weak labour productivity growth throughout the period studied.
In terms of TFP, prior to 2007, TFP was strongest in the Scandinavian countries, with Southern Eu-
rope very weak and the US and North European economies somewhere in between. During the recession,
Scandinavia and the large North European economies experienced the largest slowdowns in TFP. US TFP
growth remained positive even during the recession, although turned slightly negative later. TFP in South-
ern Europe was very negative, but TFP growth was negative before the recession so the slowdown was less.
In terms of both labour productivity growth and TFP, the strongest recovery in productivity post the Great
Recession has occurred in the large Northern European economies, although there too productivity growth
remains weak in the 2010-13 period, hence discussion of the productivity puzzle.21 Scandinavian TFP has
also recovered somewhat but remains negative in the latest period. TFP in Southern Europe also remains
negative.
The ICT (IT, CT and software) contributions follow a similar pattern to labour productivity, that is,
strong growth in the late 1990s, and weakening throughout the 2000s culminating in low contributions in
the 2010-13 period. Looking at the total ICT contribution for the aggregate of all countries, ICT capital
deepening contributed 0.61% pa of labour productivity growth of 2.11% pa (0.61/2.11=29%) in the 1995-00,
0.31% pa of 1.76% pa (18%) in 2000-07, 0.25% pa of 1.16% pa (22%) in 2007-10, and 0.11% pa of 0.55% pa
(19%) in 2010-13. Thus, as a share of labour productivity growth, ICT capital deepening has contributed
between 18% and 29% of annual growth in these fourteen OECD countries over the period studied.
The only country or country group with absolute ICT contributions higher than the all country average
is the US. In the graphics that follow, we shall use the US as a benchmark for comparison purposes. In the
US, ICT capital deepening contributed 0.86% pa of annual labour productivity growth of 2.4% pa (36%) in
1995-00, 0.42% pa of 2.1% pa (20%) in 2000-07, 0.36% pa of 1.97% pa (18%) in 2007-10, and 0.11% pa of
0.31% pa (37%) in 2010-13. Thus, as a share of ∆ln(V/H), ICT contributed in the range of 18-37% of US
annual labour productivity growth over the period studied.
For comparison, in the EU-13, the ICT contributions follow a similar pattern to those in the US, but are
substantially lower particularly for the late 1990s and early 2000s. ICT capital deepening contributed 0.31%
pa of growth of 1.75% pa (18%) in 1995-2000, 0.19% pa of 1.39% pa (14%) in 2000-07, 0.14% pa of 0.28%
pa (49%) in 2007-10, and 0.09% pa of 0.81% pa (12%) in 2010-13. Thus ICT capital deepening explained in
the range of 12-49% of labour productivity growth in the EU-13 over the period studied.
The following charts summarise our growth-accounting results for the US and the EU-13. Figures below
will present country sources of growth, relative to the US results.
The above results are based on using the national ICT deﬂators implicit in the data from OECD.Stat.
Switching to the OECD deﬂators, which are harmonised version of the US price indices, changes the picture
somewhat. Applying the OECD deﬂators to each ICT asset raises the contribution of ICT capital deepening
in the EU-13 by approximately between a quarter to a half in each period, from 0.31% pa to 0.41% pa in
1995-00, from 0.19% pa to 0.28% pa in 2000-07, from 0.14% pa to 0.19% pa in 2007-10, and from 0.09% pa
to 0.14% pa in 2010-13.
Use of the GHE deﬂators, harmonised using the price of value-added rather than the price of non-ICT
capital, has a similar eﬀect. In the case of the EU-13, the total ICT contribution in the late 1990s is raised
further to 0.46% pa, compared to 0.86% pa in the US. ICT contributions for other periods are similar to
21For an analysis of the productivity puzzle in a UK context, see Haskel et al. (2015).
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Figure 7: US Sources of Growth, 1990-2013
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Note to ﬁgure: Sources of growth for the US. Data are average growth rates for two periods: 1995-2000 and 2000-13.
Growth rates calculated as changes in the natural log. Estimates for: growth in value-added per hour (DlnVH); the
contribution of labour composition (ConDlnLH); the contribution of aggregate capital deepening (ConDlnKH_all);
TFP (DlnTFPpH); the contribution of non-ICT capital deepening (ConDlnKH_NonICT); the contribution of CT
capital deepening (ConDlnKH_CT); the contribution of IT capital deepening (ConDlnKH_IT); and the contribution
of intangible capital deepening (ConDlnKH_intan) .
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Figure 8: EU-13 Sources of Growth, 1990-2013
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Note to ﬁgure: Sources of growth for the EU-13. Data are average growth rates for two periods: 1995-2000 and 2000-
13. Growth rates calculated as changes in the natural log. Estimates for: growth in value-added per hour (DlnVH); the
contribution of labour composition (ConDlnLH); the contribution of aggregate capital deepening (ConDlnKH_all);
TFP (DlnTFPpH); the contribution of non-ICT capital deepening (ConDlnKH_NonICT); the contribution of CT
capital deepening (ConDlnKH_CT); the contribution of IT capital deepening (ConDlnKH_IT); and the contribution
of intangible capital deepening (ConDlnKH_intan) .
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those using the OECD indices, at 0.26% pa in 2000-07, 0.19% pa in 2007-10 and 0.15% pa in 2010-13.
The following charts summarise the tables in the Annex. We produce three sets of displays, one for each
set of deﬂators. For each set of deﬂators, we show 8 charts comparing the various sources of growth. Data
are presented for each country, relative to the US, such that positive values represent growth higher than the
US and negative values lower than the US. Countries are ordered by country group: Scandinavia; Northern
Europe (small); Northern Europe (large); and Southern Europe. For each country we present period averages
for two intervals: 1995-00 and 2000-13. Each ﬁgure consists of two panels. The top panel presents estimates
of labour productivity growth (∆ln(V/H), top left), the contribution of labour composition (sL∆ln(L/H),
top right), the contribution of capital deepening from all assets (sK∆ln(K/H)(all), bottom left) and ﬁ-
nally the contribution from ∆lnTFP (bottom right). The bottom panel looks more closely at the capital
contributions. Starting from the top left, we compare estimates for the contribution of non-ICT capital
deepening (sK∆ln(K/H)(non− ICT )), the contribution of CT capital deepening (sK∆ln(K/H)(CT )), the
contribution of IT capital deepening (sK∆ln(K/H)(IT )) and ﬁnally, bottom right, the contribution of intan-
gible capital deepening (sK∆ln(K/H)(intan)), where the national accounts deﬁnition of intangible capital
includes software, R&D, mineral exploration and artistic originals, but is typically dominated by software.
4.1 Sources of Growth: National ICT deﬂators
Figure 9 presents data on productivity and factor contributions based on the national ICT deﬂators. Starting
with labour productivity, as expected the data show, for most countries, labour productivity growth relatively
lower than the US. Exceptions to this include the Scandinavian countries, Finland and Sweden, each of whom
had higher labour productivity growth than the US in the late 1990s, and Ireland, especially in the late 1990s
but also to a lesser extent in the 2000s. The largest negative value for labour productivity growth relative to
the US is for Spain in the late 1990s. Looking at the data on labour composition, here European countries
typically saw stronger growth than the US, particularly in the late 1990s but also to a lesser extent in the
2000s. Exceptions to this include Germany which saw a weaker contribution than the US in both the 1990s
and 2000s. The strongest contributions from labour composition occurred in Portugal (2000-13), the UK
(1995-00) and Spain (1995-00).
On the contribution of capital deepening, relative to the US, that is smaller everywhere with a few
exceptions, notably Sweden in the late 1990s, Ireland in both the late 1990s and the 2000s, and Spain in the
2000s. Inspection of Table 4 in the Appendix reveals that the strong contribution of capital deepening in
Spain in the 2000s is largely due to a very large contribution from buildings, with the buildings contribution
rising from 0.23% pa in 2000-07, to 1.36% pa in 2007-10, and 1.21% pa in 2010-13.
On TFP, the pattern is more mixed. The ﬁrst thing that stands out is the strong TFP performance of the
Scandinavian countries, especially in the late 1990s and particularly in Finland, where TFP grew at a rate
of almost 3% pa in the 1995-00 period. TFP in Denmark and Sweden also grew faster than in the US in the
late 1990s, and at rates slightly lower than the US in the 2000s. TFP in Ireland was also substantially higher
than in the US in the late 1990s, but less in the 2000s, whilst TFP in Austria was higher than that in the
US in both periods. Of the other countries, the TFP performance of the large North European economies
(France, Germany, UK) was comparable to the US, with French TFP slightly higher than the US in the late
1990s. TFP growth in Southern Europe, in particular Spain and Italy, was considerably slower than the US.
Moving on to the bottom panel of Figure 9, we look more closely at the contribution of capital deepening.
Starting with non-ICT capital, top left, the data show a particularly strong contribution in Ireland in both
periods. The data also show stronger contributions relative to the US for Sweden (late 1990s), Germany
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Figure 9: Sources of Growth, by country (1995-2000 and 2000-13), relative to US, national ICT deﬂators
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Note to ﬁgure: Sources of growth relative to the US, by country, such that positive values represent growth higher
than the US and negative values lower than the US. Countries ordered by country group: Scandinavia, Northern
Europe (small), Northern Europe (large) and Southern Europe. Data for two periods: 1995-00 and 2000-13. Top panel
presents labour productivity growth (DlnVH), the contribution of labour composition (ConDlnLH), the contribution
of aggregate capital deepening (ConDlnKH(all)) and TFP (DlnTFP). Bottom panel breaks out the capital deepening
contribution into contributions from non-ICT capital (ConDlnKH(NonICT)), CT equipment (ConDlnKH(CT)), IT
hardware (ConDlnKH(IT)) and intangible capital (ConDlnKH(intan)). Data for earlier years are missing for some
countries. Therefore data for Belgium, Denmark, Ireland, Portugal are from 1999 and data for Sweden are from 1997,
rather than from 1995.
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(late 1990s), UK (late 1990s) and Spain (2000s), with the latter reﬂecting the construction boom in Spain
prior to the ﬁnancial crisis.
The next panel compares the contribution of CT equipment across countries. The pattern is fairly
uniform across countries, showing consistently smaller growth compared to the US, typically by around
0.1% pa. The exception to this is Sweden, where CT capital deepening contributed 0.24% pa of growth in
labour productivity (1997-00), compared to a contribution of 0.16% pa (1995-00) in the US. In the 2000s,
the contribution of CT capital deepening in Sweden weakened to 0.06% pa , compared to 0.09% pa for the
US. Of the other countries, relative to the US, the largest contributions were in the UK and Portugal, at
0.11% pa in the late 1990s and 0.05% pa in the 2000s in the UK, and 0.06% pa in the 2000s in Portugal.
On the contribution of IT hardware, there is a consistently large diﬀerential relative to the US for all
countries in the late 1990s. This is a well-documented ﬁnding, with the contribution to productivity from
the use of ICT capital shown to far lower in European countries than the US (see for example, van Ark
et al. (2008)). In particular, France, Spain and Italy have IT contributions almost 0.4% pa less than the
US contribution. The smallest diﬀerences relative to the US in the late 1990s are found in the Netherlands
(0.28% pa compared to 0.41% pa in the US), Germany (0.26% pa), Sweden (0.24% pa) and the UK (0.2%
pa). In the 2000s, the gap relative to the US closes considerably, such that Germany (0.12% pa), Sweden
(0.11% pa) and the Netherlands (0.1% pa) have slightly higher contributions from IT than the US (0.09%
pa). Finally, for intangibles, we ﬁnd consistently lower contributions in Europe compared to the US, by
around 0.1-0.2% pa for most countries, with the exceptions of Sweden in the late 1990s and Ireland in the
2000s, with the latter estimated to have a particularly large intangibles contribution of 0.71% pa in the latter
period.
4.2 Sources of Growth: OECD Harmonised ICT deﬂators
Figure 10 presents similar charts to above but this time using the OECD harmonised ICT deﬂators in
estimating capital services. We focus on the ICT capital deepening contributions in the bottom panel.
First, from the data for IT hardware (bottom left), we see that the picture has changed considerably for
many countries. The diﬀerence in European IT contributions compared to the US in the late 1990s is
considerably smaller for most countries, and for some countries it is eliminated entirely. In the 2000s, the
majority of countries move from having lower IT contributions relative to the US to having very comparable
contributions that are in some cases higher than the US. Moving from left to right, we ﬁrst consider the
Scandinavian economies. Applying the OECD indices dramatically changes the picture for Denmark, with
the IT contribution in the late 1990s raised from 0.14% pa to 0.35% pa, reducing the gap from -0.28% pa to
-0.06% pa. In the 2000s, the IT contribution is raised from 0.08% pa to 0.19% pa, such that the gap with
the US moves from marginally negative at -0.01% pa, to a positive value of +0.1% pa. For Finland, applying
the OECD harmonised deﬂators has little impact, with the national IT deﬂator being just as aggressive as
the OECD harmonised version, as shown in Figure 5. Therefore the IT contribution is slightly reduced, from
0.11% pa to 0.10% pa in the late 1990s, marginally increasing the gap with the US from -0.3% pa to -0.31%
pa. The Finnish IT contribution in the 2000s is unaﬀected. For Sweden, the IT hardware contribution is
raised dramatically in the late 1990s, from 0.24% pa to 0.41% pa, eliminating entirely the gap with the US
which had been -0.18% pa using the national deﬂators. In the 2000s, the contribution is reduced from 0.11%
pa to 0.09% pa, such that the gap is reduced from +0.02% pa to 0% pa.
Regarding the small Northern European economies, for Austria, applying the OECD harmonised indices
raises the IT contribution from 0.09% pa to 0.17% pa in the ﬁrst period, and from 0.01% pa to 0.08% pa in
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the second period, so that the gap with the US falls from -0.33% pa to -0.24% pa in the late 1990s, and from
-0.08% pa to -0.01% pa in the 2000s. For Belgium, the IT contribution in the late 1990s is almost trebled,
from 0.13% pa to 0.38% pa, almost eliminating the gap with the US, which moves from -0.28% pa to -0.04%
pa. For the 2000s, it is increased from just 0.02% pa to as much as 0.18%, such that the gap with the US
moves from negative to outstripping the US, from -0.07% pa to +0.09% pa. For Ireland, the contribution
in the late 1990s is more than doubled, from 0.14% pa to 0.31% pa and reducing the gap relative to the US
from -0.27% pa to -0.1% pa, whilst that in the 2000s doubles from 0.05% pa to 0.1% pa, so that the gap
goes from -0.04% pa to +0.01% pa. For the Netherlands, applying the harmonised deﬂators changes very
little, with the national IT price index being very close to the OECD harmonised version. There, the IT
contribution for the late 1990s moves in the other direction, dropping from 0.28% pa to 0.26% pa, such that
the gap increases from -0.13% pa to -0.16% pa. In the 2000s, the IT contribution using national deﬂators is
already marginally higher than the US (0.1% pa compared to 0.09% pa), and applying the OECD deﬂators
raises the gap to +0.02% pa.
Moving on to the larger North European economies, for France, in the 1990s the IT contribution is raised
from 0.03% pa to 0.09% pa, decreasing the gap relative to the US from -0.39% pa to a still large -0.33%
pa. The eﬀect in the 2000s is smaller, with the contribution raised from 0.02% pa to 0.04% pa, reducing the
gap in the 2000s from -0.07% pa to -0.05% pa. For Germany, applying the OECD indices has little eﬀect on
the IT contribution and even increases the gap relative to the US in the 2000s. The 1990s IT contribution
remains at 0.26% pa using either deﬂator, giving a gap of -0.15% pa. In the 2000s, use of the harmonised
index reduces the contribution from 0.12% pa to 0.09% pa, and the gap moves from +0.03% pa to 0% pa.
Recall that Germany does not produce national price indices for IT equipment, so the deﬂator used there was
already a harmonised price index taken from EUKLEMS. For the UK, the impact is again quite small, with
the national deﬂator already incorporating large price declines in IT equipment. There, the IT contribution
in the late 1990s is raised from 0.2% pa to 0.23% pa, reducing the gap with the US from -0.21% pa to -0.18%
pa. In the 2000s, the contribution is almost doubled, from 0.04% pa to 0.07% pa, reducing the gap from
-0.05% pa to -0.02% pa.
Finally, we look at the South European economies. For Spain, the IT contribution is more than trebled
in the late 1990s, but from a low base, such that it is raised from 0.04% pa to 0.14%, but the gap remains
at -0.28% pa having reduced from -0.37% pa. For the 2000s, the impact is larger, with the IT contribution
raised from 0.01% pa to 0.08% pa, reducing the gap from -0.08% pa to -0.01% pa. For Italy, switching
deﬂators raises the IT contribution in 1995-00 from 0.06% pa to 0.14% pa reducing the gap with the US
from -0.35% pa to a still substantial -0.28% pa. In the 2000s, the IT contribution is raised from 0.01% pa to
0.06% pa, reducing the gap with the US from -0.08% pa to -0.03% pa.
Therefore, we ﬁnd that, although there is some variation by country, a substantial part of the diﬀerence
between the IT contributions in the US and Europe can be explained by diﬀerences in estimates of IT
price changes. Using our growth accounting results for the EU-13 and the US, using national and OECD
harmonised deﬂators, switching to the OECD harmonised deﬂators accounts for 15% of the gap in the IT
contribution in 1995-00, 69% of the gap in 2000-07, and 21% of the gap in 2007-10. In 2010-13, the IT
contribution in the EU-13 is already higher than estimates for the US, regardless of the price index used.
However, we ﬁnd that when we compare estimates of the contribution of CT equipment using the national
and harmonised deﬂators, we do not see the same eﬀect, that is, switching to the harmonised deﬂators
does not explain so much of the diﬀerence in the CT contribution relative to the US. Looking ﬁrst at the
Scandinavian countries, applying the OECD harmonised deﬂator to Denmark reduces the contribution of CT
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Figure 10: Sources of Growth, by country (1995-2000 and 2000-13), relative to US, OECD harmonised ICT
deﬂators
-2
.0
-1
.0
0.
0
1.
0
2.
0
3.
0
D
ln
V
H
 re
la
tiv
e 
to
 U
S
DN
K
FI
N
SW
E
AU
T
BE
L
IR
L
NL
D
FR
A
GE
R UK ES
P
IT
A
PR
T
Memo: US DlnVH 95-00=2.4%pa; 00-13=1.66%pa
DlnVH
1995-00 2000-13
-0
.4
-0
.2
0.
0
0.
2
0.
4
0.
6
C
on
D
ln
LH
 re
la
tiv
e 
to
 U
S
DN
K
FI
N
SW
E
AU
T
BE
L
IR
L
NL
D
FR
A
GE
R UK ES
P
IT
A
PR
T
Memo: US ConDlnLH 95-00=0.15%pa; 00-13=0.18%pa
ConDlnLH
1995-00 2000-13
-1
.0
-0
.5
0.
0
0.
5
1.
0
1.
5
C
on
D
ln
K
H
(a
ll)
 re
la
tiv
e 
to
 U
S
DN
K
FI
N
SW
E
AU
T
BE
L
IR
L
NL
D
FR
A
GE
R UK ES
P
IT
A
PR
T
Memo: US ConDlnKH(all) 95-00=1.32%pa; 00-13=1.09%pa
ConDlnKH(all)
1995-00 2000-13
-2
.0
-1
.0
0.
0
1.
0
2.
0
D
ln
TF
P
 re
la
tiv
e 
to
 U
S
DN
K
FI
N
SW
E
AU
T
BE
L
IR
L
NL
D
FR
A
GE
R UK ES
P
IT
A
PR
T
Memo: US DlnTFP 95-00=0.94%pa; 00-13=0.39%pa
DlnTFP
1995-00 2000-13
-1
.0
-0
.5
0.
0
0.
5
1.
0
C
on
D
ln
K
H
(N
on
IC
T)
 re
la
tiv
e 
to
 U
S
DN
K
FI
N
SW
E
AU
T
BE
L
IR
L
NL
D
FR
A
GE
R UK ES
P
IT
A
PR
T
Memo: US ConDlnKH(NonICT) 95-00=0.4%pa; 00-13=0.54%pa
ConDlnKH(NonICT)
1995-00 2000-13
-0
.1
5
-0
.1
0
-0
.0
5
0.
00
0.
05
C
on
D
ln
K
H
(C
T)
 re
la
tiv
e 
to
 U
S
DN
K
FI
N
SW
E
AU
T
BE
L
IR
L
NL
D
FR
A
GE
R UK ES
P
IT
A
PR
T
Memo: US ConDlnKH(CT) 95-00=0.16%pa; 00-13=0.09%pa
ConDlnKH(CT)
1995-00 2000-13
-0
.3
-0
.2
-0
.1
0.
0
0.
1
C
on
D
ln
K
H
(IT
) r
el
at
iv
e 
to
 U
S
DN
K
FI
N
SW
E
AU
T
BE
L
IR
L
NL
D
FR
A
GE
R UK ES
P
IT
A
PR
T
Memo: US ConDlnKH(IT) 95-00=0.41%pa; 00-13=0.09%pa
ConDlnKH(IT)
1995-00 2000-13
-0
.4
-0
.2
0.
0
0.
2
0.
4
C
on
D
ln
K
H
(in
ta
n)
 re
la
tiv
e 
to
 U
S
DN
K
FI
N
SW
E
AU
T
BE
L
IR
L
NL
D
FR
A
GE
R UK ES
P
IT
A
PR
T
Memo: US ConDlnKH(intan) 95-00=0.35%pa; 00-13=0.37%pa
ConDlnKH(intan)
1995-00 2000-13
Note to ﬁgure: Sources of growth relative to the US, by country, such that positive values represent growth higher
than the US and negative values lower than the US. Countries ordered by country group: Scandinavia, Northern
Europe (small), Northern Europe (large) and Southern Europe. Data for two periods: 1995-00 and 2000-13. Top panel
presents labour productivity growth (DlnVH), the contribution of labour composition (ConDlnLH), the contribution
of aggregate capital deepening (ConDlnKH(all)) and TFP (DlnTFP). Bottom panel breaks out the capital deepening
contribution into contributions from non-ICT capital (ConDlnKH(NonICT)), CT equipment (ConDlnKH(CT)), IT
hardware (ConDlnKH(IT)) and intangible capital (ConDlnKH(intan)). Data for earlier years are missing for some
countries. Therefore data for Belgium, Ireland, Portugal (1995-00) are from 1999 and data for Sweden are from 1997,
rather than 1995. Note, when comparing with national deﬂators, that data for Denmark now also begin in 1995 when
applying harmonised deﬂators.
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equipment in the late 1990s, from 0.02% pa to 0.01% pa, maintaining the gap relative to the US at -0.14%
pa.22 The contribution for the 2000s is unaﬀected, maintaining a gap relative to the US of -0.08% pa. For
Finland, the contribution of CT capital deepening in the late 1990s is raised but only reducing the gap by
0.01% pa in each period. For Sweden, the contribution of CT equipment is already higher than the US in
the late 1990s. Using the harmonised deﬂator actually reduces the contribution of CT capital deepening in
Sweden in the late 1990s, from 0.24% pa to 0.22% pa, such that the gap moves from +0.08% pa to +0.06%
pa. In the 2000s, applying the harmonised deﬂator raises the CT contribution from 0.06% pa to 0.08% pa,
changing from -0.03% pa to -0.02% pa relative to the US .
Next, looking at the smaller Northern European economies, we do ﬁnd some impact from applying
the OECD harmonised CT deﬂator, although the absolute changes are much smaller than those to the
contribution of IT hardware. For Austria, switching to the harmonised deﬂators raises the CT contribution
in the late 1990s from 0.08% pa to 0.11% pa, such that the gap with the US reduces from -0.08% pa to
-0.05% pa. In the 2000s, the CT contribution is raised considerably, from 0.01% pa to 0.08% pa, almost
eliminating the gap with the US which moves from -0.08% pa to -0.02% pa. For Belgium, switching deﬂators
doubles the CT contribution in the late 1990s from 0.03% pa to 0.06% pa, reducing the gap with the US
from -0.13% pa to -0.1% pa. In the 2000s the CT contribution is more than doubled from 0.02% pa to 0.05%
pa, reducing the gap from -0.07% pa to -0.05% pa. For Ireland, the CT contribution in the ﬁrst period is
raised from 0.07% pa to 0.1% pa, and from 0.02% pa to 0.04% pa in the second period, reducing the gap
from -0.08% pa to -0.06% pa in each period. For the Netherlands, switching deﬂators has little impact, with
the national CT deﬂator exhibiting very similar price changes to the OECD harmonised deﬂator. There,
the CT contribution is actually reduced in the late 1990s, from 0.01% pa to 0% pa, increasing the gap from
-0.15% pa to -0.16% pa, and remains at 0.01% pa in the 2000s, reducing the gap from -0.09% pa to -0.08%
pa.
Turning to the large North European economies, ﬁrst, for France, applying the OECD harmonised deﬂator
raises the CT contribution in the 1990s from 0.03% pa to 0.04% pa, reducing the gap with the US from
-0.13% pa to -0.11% pa. In the 2000s, the contribution doubles, from 0.02% pa to 0.04% pa, such that the
gap falls from -0.08% pa to -0.06% pa. For Germany, in the late 1990s the contribution remains at 0.04%
pa, such that the gap relative to the US remains at -0.12% pa, and in the 2000s the contribution is raised
from 0.02% pa to 0.03% pa, such that the gap reduced from -0.07% pa to -0.06% pa. For the UK, the CT
contribution in the 1990s rises from 0.11% pa to 0.12% pa, maintaining a gap of -0.04% pa, and in the 2000s
the CT contribution is reduced from 0.05% pa to 0.04% pa, such that the gap increases from -0.05% to
-0.06% pa.
Finally, we compare for Southern Europe. First, for Spain, the CT contribution is raised in the 1990s,
but from only 0.01% pa to 0.02%, maintaining a gap with the US of -0.14% pa. In the 2000s, the CT
contribution is raised from 0.02% pa to 0.04% pa, reducing the gap from -0.08% pa to -0.05% pa. For Italy,
the contribution in the 1990s is raised marginally from 0.03% pa to 0.04% pa, such that the gap remains
-0.12% pa. In the 2000s, the contribution is raised from 0.03% pa to 0.04% pa, and the gap reduced from
-0.07% pa to -0.05% pa. Finally, for Portugal, the CT contribution in the late 1990s is raised from 0.06% pa
to 0.1% pa, reducing the gap relative to the US from -0.1% pa to -0.05% pa. For the 2000s, the contribution
increases less, from 0.06% pa to 0.07% pa, such that the gap remains at -0.03% pa.
Therefore we ﬁnd that, in general, unlike for IT hardware, increasing the consistency in CT price measures
across countries explains less of the diﬀerential in the contribution of CT equipment when comparing data
22Where the change in contribution is more/less than the change in the gap with the US, this is due to rounding.
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from EU countries with the US, although this does of course vary by country. The growth-accounting results
presented in Tables 4 and 5 show that using OECD harmonised deﬂators for CT equipment, as opposed
to national deﬂators, results in the contribution of CT capital deepening in the EU-13 being estimated as
higher, but the diﬀerence is marginal. In 1995-2000, the CT contribution remains at 0.05% pa. In both
2000-07 and 2007-10, the CT contribution is raised from 0.03% pa to 0.04% pa. In the ﬁnal 2010-13 period,
the CT contribution is raised from 0.02% pa to 0.03% pa. The reason is that although application of the
OECD harmonised indices raises the CT contribution in some economies, notably the small North European
and Southern European economies in our categorisation, in the large Northern European economies and
also Scandinavia, already aggressive national price indices mean there is less eﬀect and in some cases the
eﬀect is reversed. Therefore we estimate that, in 1995-2000, 4% of the EU13-US gap can be explained by
diﬀering measurement of price change for CT equipment, rising to 16% in 2000-07, 18% in 2007-10, and
48% in 2010-13. Thus, the smaller contribution of CT capital deepening in the EU-13 relative to the US is
explained by diﬀerences in growth of CT capital services and its factor income share, which depend in turn
on the level of the CT capital stock, the rate of CT investment and the net rate of return to capital.23
The other ICT asset not yet discussed is software. In the charts shown above, software is grouped
with other national accounts intangibles, namely R&D, mineral exploration and artistic originals, but with
software being the largest component. The charts show that use of the harmonised software deﬂators
generally increases the contribution of intangible capital deepening in EU-13 countries, especially in the late
1990s, reducing the gap relative to the US. For instance, in the late 1990s, applying OECD harmonised
deﬂators for software raises the contribution of intangibles in Sweden from 0.46% pa to 0.58% pa, in the
Netherlands from 0.24% pa to 0.29% pa, in France from 0.20% pa to 0.34% pa, in the UK from 0.19% pa to
0.26% pa, in Spain from 0.03% pa to 0.07% pa, in Italy from 0.08% pa to 0.15% pa, and ﬁnally in Portugal
from 0.1% pa to 0.15% pa. In the 2000s, the eﬀect is less but still substantial in some cases. For instance, in
Denmark the contribution of intangibles is raised from 0.25% pa to 0.31% pa, and in Sweden from 0.24% pa
to 0.31% pa. Of the North European economies, in the Netherlands, the intangibles contribution is raised
from 0.17% pa to 0.23% pa, and in France from 0.2% pa to 0.25% pa. Of those in Southern Europe, in Spain
the intangibles contribution is raised from 0.18% pa to 0.24% pa and in Italy from 0.05% pa to 0.1% pa.
In the growth-accounting tables presented in the appendix (Tables 4 and 5) we estimate the contribution
of software capital deepening separately from the contributions of other intangibles. Looking at the data for
the EU-13, applying national deﬂators yields an estimate for the contribution of software capital deepening
of 0.12% pa in 1995-00, 0.09% pa in 2000-07, 0.07% pa in 2007-10 and 0.06% pa in 2010-13. In comparison,
for the US, software contributions were: 0.3% pa in 1995-00; 0.18% pa in 2000-07; 0.18% pa in 2007-10
and 0.07% pa in 2010-13; all considerably higher than contributions in the EU-13 with the exception of the
ﬁnal period. However, once we apply the OECD harmonised deﬂators, the contribution of software capital
deepening in the EU-13 is raised substantially, to 0.18% pa in 1995-00, 0.12% pa in 2000-07, 0.1% pa in
2007-10 and 0.09% pa in 2010-13. Therefore, we estimate that in the 1995-00 period, 34% of the US-EU13
gap in the contribution of software can be explained by diﬀering estimates of price change, rising to 40% in
2000-07, 25% in 2007-10 and over 100% in 2010-13.
In terms of individual countries, for which switching from national deﬂators to OECD harmonised de-
ﬂators has the largest eﬀect, for France, the switch raises the contribution of software capital deepening in
1995-00 from 0.15% pa to 0.29% pa, and in 2000-13, from 0.13% pa to 0.18% pa, such that the gap with
23Other parameters such as the CT depreciation rate and holding gains/losses are not a factor in explaining diﬀerences between
countries: we apply the same depreciation rate for CT capital across countries and the use of harmonised deﬂators also means
that changes in valuation are fairly similar across countries.
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the US is eliminated entirely in the ﬁrst period, moving from -0.15% pa to 0% pa, and surpassed in the
2000s, moving from -0.03% pa to +0.03% pa. For Italy, in the late 1990s the software contribution is raised
from 0.09% pa to 0.15% pa, reducing the gap with the US from -0.21% pa to -0.14% pa, and in the 2000s
the contribution is raised from zero to 0.06% pa, reducing the gap from -0.15% pa to -0.09% pa. For the
Netherlands, the contribution in the late 1990s increases from 0.2% pa to 0.25% pa, reducing the gap from
-0.09% pa to -0.04%, and in the 2000s from 0.12% pa to 0.18%, changing the sign relative to the US from
-0.03% pa to +0.03% pa. For Sweden, in the 1990s the contribution is raised from 0.18% pa to 0.3% pa, fully
eliminating the gap with the US which moves from -0.12% pa to 0% pa, and in the 2000s the contribution is
raised from 0.08% pa to 0.15% pa, eliminating almost all of the gap with the US which moves from -0.07%
pa to -0.01% pa.
4.3 Sources of Growth: GHE Harmonised ICT deﬂators
As set out above, we also work with our own (GHE) set of harmonised deﬂators, based on the ratio of CT
prices to the implied price of value-added. Figure 11 presents estimates of the various sources of growth
when we apply these alternative price indices. Focusing on the ICT contributions, we see that, although
the GHE harmonised indices look very similar to the harmonised deﬂators produced by the OECD, that for
IT hardware is actually slightly more aggressive, so that applying them tends to raise the IT, and therefore
ICT, contribution further, and therefore helps to explain more of the gap in ICT contributions relative to the
US. Relative to the OECD harmonised deﬂator, the GHE harmonised deﬂators also raise the contribution
of software capital deepening but reduce the contribution of CT capital deepening.
Looking ﬁrst at the IT hardware contributions, they are raised almost across the board such that the
gap in the contribution relative to the US disappears for around half of the EU countries in our dataset.
First, of the Scandinavian countries, the IT contribution for Denmark is raised substantially in the late
1990s from 0.14% pa (national deﬂator) to 0.55% pa (+0.14% pa relative to US) and in the 2000s from 0.08%
pa to 0.2% pa (+0.11% pa relative to US). For Finland, the eﬀect is less marked, there the contribution rises
from 0.11% pa to 0.16% pa in the late 1990s (-0.25% pa relative to US) and from 0.03% pa to 0.04% pa in
the 2000s (-0.05% pa relative to US). For Sweden, the eﬀect is larger, there the IT contribution is raised
from 0.24% pa to a very large 0.58% pa in the late 1990s (+0.17% pa relative to US), but is unchanged in
the 2000s at 0.11% pa (+0.02% pa relative to US).
Second, of the smaller North European economies, for Austria the IT contribution is raised further, from
0.09% pa to 0.24% pa (-0.17% pa relative to US) in the late 1990s, and from 0.01% pa to 0.09% pa (0% pa
relative to US) in the 2000s. For Belgium, the contribution is raised substantially, from 0.13% pa to 0.53% pa
in the ﬁrst period (+0.11% pa relative to US) and from 0.02% pa to 0.19% pa in the second period (+0.1%
pa relative to US). For Ireland, the late 1990s contribution rises from to 0.14% pa to 0.41% pa eliminating
any gap relative to the US (0% pa), and in the 2000s from 0.05% pa to 0.1% pa (+0.01% pa relative to US).
For the Netherlands, the IT contribution in the ﬁrst period is raised from 0.28% pa to 0.36% pa (-0.05% pa
relative to US), and in the second period from 0.1% pa to 0.12% pa (+0.03% pa relative to US).
Of the larger North European countries, for France the IT contribution in the ﬁrst period is raised from
0.03% pa to 0.12% pa (-0.29% pa relative to US) and in the second period from 0.02% pa to 0.04% pa (-
0.05% pa relative to US). For Germany, the eﬀect in the 1990s is more substantial, with the IT contribution
raised from 0.26% pa to 0.35% pa (-0.06% pa relative to US), with less of an impact in the 2000s when the
contribution is reduced from 0.12% pa to 0.1% pa (+0.01% pa relative to US). For the UK, again the largest
impact occurs in the 1990s, with the contribution raised from 0.2% pa to 0.32% pa (-0.09% pa relative to
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Figure 11: Sources of Growth, by country (1995-2000 and 2000-13), relative to US, GHE harmonised ICT
deﬂators
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Note to ﬁgure: Sources of growth relative to the US, by country, such that positive values represent growth higher
than the US and negative values lower than the US. Countries ordered by country group: Scandinavia, Northern
Europe (small), Northern Europe (large) and Southern Europe. Data for two periods: 1995-00 and 2000-13. Top panel
presents labour productivity growth (DlnVH), the contribution of labour composition (ConDlnLH), the contribution
of aggregate capital deepening (ConDlnKH(all)) and TFP (DlnTFP). Bottom panel breaks out the capital deepening
contribution into contributions from non-ICT capital (ConDlnKH(NonICT)), CT equipment (ConDlnKH(CT)), IT
hardware (ConDlnKH(IT)) and intangible capital (ConDlnKH(intan)). Data for earlier years are missing for some
countries. Therefore data for Belgium, Ireland, Portugal (1995-00) are from 1999 and data for Sweden are from 1997,
rather than 1995. Note, when comparing with national deﬂators, that data for Denmark now also begin in 1995 when
applying harmonised deﬂators.
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US), and in the 2000s from 0.04% pa to 0.07% pa (-0.02% pa relative to US).
Finally, of the South European economies, for Spain, the 1990s IT contribution is raised substantially,
from 0.04% pa to 0.2% pa (-0.22% pa relative to US), and also in the 2000s from 0.01% pa to 0.08% pa
(-0.01% pa relative to US). For Italy, the IT contribution is raised from 0.06% pa to 0.19% pa (-0.23% pa
relative to US) in the 1990s, and from 0.01% pa to 0.07% pa (-0.03% pa relative to US) in the 2000s. Finally,
for Portugal, again the biggest impact occurs in the 1990s, where the IT contribution is raised from 0.11%
pa to a large 0.41% pa (0% pa relative to US). In the 2000s, the Portuguese IT contribution is raised from
0.05% pa to 0.11% pa (+0.02% pa relative to US), thus eliminating any gap with the US in both periods.
Therefore using the GHE harmonised price indices can explain even more of the gap in IT contributions
of the EU-13 relative to the US. Using our growth-accounting estimates (Tables 4 and 6) we estimate that for
1995-00, 43% of the IT gap relative to the US can be explained by price diﬀerentials (compared to 15% using
OECD harmonised deﬂators), for 2000-07, 70% of the gap can be explained by prices (68% using OECD
harmonised deﬂators), and for 2007-10 it is 49% (21% using OECD harmonised deﬂators). For 2010-13, EU-
13 estimates for the contribution of IT capital deepening are higher than for the US using either national or
both versions of the harmonised deﬂators.
On software, we ﬁnd that the impact using the GHE harmonised indices is less but similar to that using
the OECD harmonised indices. From the data presented in Tables 4 and 6, we estimate that for 1995-00,
price diﬀerentials explain 20% of the gap in the software contribution relative to the US (34% using OECD
harmonised deﬂators), for 2000-07, 23% of the gap can be explained by price diﬀerentials (40% using OECD
harmonised deﬂators), for 2007-10, prices explain 13% of the gap (25% using OECD harmonised deﬂators),
and for 2010-13, prices explain over 100% of the gap relative to the US (100% using OECD harmonised
deﬂators).
However, again, applying the GHE harmonised deﬂators to CT equipment has far less impact than in the
case of IT hardware, and also to a lesser extent software, such that the CT gap relative to the US persists
for all countries with the exception of Sweden in the late 1990s. In cases where the gap relative to the US
is reduced, the change tends to be quite marginal. Further, applying the GHE deﬂators to CT equipment
has slightly less impact than the OECD harmonised deﬂators in terms of raising EU contributions. Using
estimates provided in Tables 4 and 6, we estimate that for 1995-2000, diﬀering estimates of price change
explain 0% of the gap in the CT contribution relative to the US (4% using OECD harmonised deﬂators), for
2000-07, this rises to 14% (16% using OECD harmonised deﬂators), for 2010-13, prices explain 13% of the
gap (18% using OECD harmonised deﬂators), and ﬁnally, for 2010-13, 35% (48% using OECD harmonised
deﬂators) of the gap relative to the US is explained by diﬀering estimates of price changes for CT equipment.
To summarise, Figure 12 presents estimates of the contribution of CT capital deepening relative to the
US, using each alternative deﬂator.
Thus, from Figure 12, the countries for which applying harmonised CT deﬂators, as opposed to national
deﬂators, has the largest impact is Austria (both periods but in particular the second period), Portugal
(particularly in the ﬁrst period), Ireland (both periods) and also Belgium (both periods). However, in aggre-
gate, growth-accounting estimates for the EU-13 show that the contributions of CT capital deepening using
GHE harmonised deﬂators remain close to those using OECD harmonised deﬂators. Moving from national
deﬂators to the OECD harmonised deﬂators raises the contribution of CT capital deepening throughout the
2000s, from 0.03% pa to 0.04% pa in 2000-07, from 0.03% pa to 0.04% pa in 2007-10, and from 0.02% pa to
0.03% pa in 2010-13. Switching to the GHE harmonised deﬂators has less impact still. The contribution of
CT capital deepening remains the same as under the OECD harmonised deﬂators for the ﬁrst three periods.
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Figure 12: Contribution of CT capital deepening, by country (1995-2000 and 2000-13), relative to US, using
alternative CT deﬂators
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Note to ﬁgure: Contribution of capital deepening in CT equipment (ConDlnKH(CT)) relative to the US, by country,
such that positive values represent growth higher than the US and negative values lower than the US. Countries
ordered by country group: Scandinavia, Northern Europe (small), Northern Europe (large) and Southern Europe.
Data for two periods: 1995-00 and 2000-13. Data for earlier years are missing for some countries. Therefore data
for Belgium, Ireland, Portugal (1995-00) are from 1999 and data for Sweden are from 1997, rather than 1995. In
ﬁrst chart, using national deﬂators (top left), data for Denmark also start in 1999. In second chart, using OECD
harmonised deﬂators (top right), and third chart using GHE harmonised deﬂators (bottom left), data for Denmark
start in 1995.
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Table 3: Summary of results (using OECD harmonised ICT deﬂators), 2000-13
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
ICT/ΣI (00) ICT/ΣI (13) PKKCT/ΣPKK (00) PKKCT/ΣPKK (13) Δln(V/H) (00-13) ConΔln(KCT/H) (00-13) Share of LPG: (6)/(5)
All countries 3.5% 4.3% 3.8% 2.4% 1.3% 0.07% 5.1%
of which:
US 4.5% 5.3% 4.8% 2.9% 1.7% 0.09% 5.7%
EU-13 2.2% 3.1% 2.5% 1.6% 1.0% 0.04% 3.9%
of which:
N. Europe (large) 2.4% 2.7% 2.5% 1.6% 1.1% 0.03% 3.1%
N. Europe (small) 1.9% 3.3% 2.5% 1.7% 1.1% 0.04% 3.4%
S. Europe 2.1% 3.8% 2.5% 1.7% 0.6% 0.04% 6.9%
Scandinavia 2.6% 3.2% 2.6% 1.9% 1.1% 0.05% 4.5%
Memo:
Sweden (SWE) 4.2% 4.7% 4.4% 3.0% 1.5% 0.08% 5.3%
Notes to table: Columns 1 and 2 are real CT investment as a share of total real investment in 2000 and 2013 respectively.
Columns 3 and 4 are nominal CT capital services as a share of total capital services in 2000 and 2013 respectively. Column 5 is
growth in labour productivity, estimated as growth in value-added per person-hour worked over the period 2000-13. Column 6
is the contribution of CT capital deepening, namely growth in CT capital services per hour multiplied by the CT share in total
income, over the period 2000-13. Column 7 is the share of labour productivity growth accounted for by the contribution of CT
capital deepening, estimated as column 6 over column 5. Growth rates are averages for the period shown and are calculated as
the change in the natural log. All estimates produced using constant-quality OECD harmonised ICT deﬂators.
In the ﬁnal 2010-13 period, the CT contribution is reduced to 0.02% pa. These results emphasise our ﬁnding
that whilst inconsistencies in price estimates can explain a substantial part of the EU13-US gap in the IT
hardware and software contributions, the same cannot be said of the CT contribution. Thus the gap in
the EU CT contribution relative to the US is predominantly due to diﬀerence in the growth of CT capital
services and the CT factor income share, rather than diﬀering estimates of price change for CT equipment.
Table 3 summarises some of our key results. We present data for the period 2000-13, for our broader
country aggregates, on the share of real CT investment in total real investment in 2000 and 2013 (columns 1
and 2), the share of nominal CT capital services in total nominal capital services in 2000 and 2013 (columns
3 and 4), labour productivity growth (column 5), the contribution of CT capital deepening (column 6), and
ﬁnally the share of labour productivity growth accounted for by CT capital deepening (column 7, estimated
as column 6 over column 5). All results presented in this table are estimated using the OECD harmonised
ICT deﬂators.
From Table 3, columns 1 and 2, we see that real CT investment as a share of total real investment is
highest in the US, at 4.5% in 2000, compared to 2.2% in the EU-13, and at 5.3% in 2013, compared to 3.1%
in the EU-13. Data for EU country groups show that the CT real investment share is fairly similar across
country groups. In 2000, it is highest in Scandinavia, and in 2013, it is highest in Southern Europe. In the
ﬁnal row, we present data for Sweden as a memo item. We note that the share of real CT investment in
Sweden is higher than that for each EU country group and higher than the average for all countries (ﬁrst
row) in both 2000 and 2013. As a share of real investment, over the period CT investment has grown in all
country and country groups presented here.
The contribution of capital deepening depends on the capital income share and growth in capital services.
In columns 3 and 4 we present the share of nominal CT capital services (i.e. CT user costs) as a share of
total nominal capital services. First we note that, unlike the real investment share, the share of CT user
costs in total capital user costs has declined over the period, and this is true for all countries and country
groups presented here. Again, we note that the CT share in total capital is higher in the US relative to the
EU-13, at 4.8% compared to 2.5% in 2000, and at 2.9% compared to 1.6% in 2013. CT capital shares in EU
country groups are strikingly similar to those for the entire EU-13. The CT capital share is however higher
in Sweden, where it is marginally higher than that in the US in 2013.
Columns 5, 6 and 7 present data on growth in labour productivity, the contribution of CT capital deep-
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ening to growth in labour productivity, and the share of labour growth accounted for by that contribution.
First, we note that, over the period, labour productivity growth was strongest in the US, at 1.7% pa com-
pared to 1% in the EU-13. Within the EU-13, labour productivity growth was similar across country groups,
at 1.1% pa, except for Southern Europe where labour productivity growth was weaker, at 0.6% pa. Again,
we note that Sweden is an exception to this pattern, with labour productivity growth of 1.5% pa, higher than
the all country average of 1.3% pa. On the contribution of CT capital deepening, column 6 shows that again
this was highest in the US, at 0.09% pa compared to 0.04% pa in the EU-13. Within the EU-13, the CT
contribution was lowest in the large North European countries, at 0.03% pa, the same as the EU-13 average
in the small North European and South European economies at 0.04% pa, and highest in Scandinavia at
0.05% pa. Again, the Swedish performance stands out. There the CT contribution was higher than that in
EU country groups, and the all country average, and marginally lower than the US, at 0.08% pa. Column 7
presents the share of labour productivity growth accounted for by the contribution of CT capital deepening.
That share is highest in South Europe, at 6.9%, due to weak labour productivity growth of just 0.6% pa. In
the US, CT capital deepening explained 5.7% of labour productivity growth in the 2000s, compared to 3.9%
in the EU-13. EU country groups for which the share explained is higher than the EU-13 are South Europe
(6.9%) and Scandinavia, at 4.5%. The share of labour productivity growth explained in Sweden was 5.3%,
higher than the all country average of 5.1%.
Finally, in Figure 13 we explore the relative importance of individual assets in our various country groups
using Harberger diagrams ((Harberger, 1998);(Inklaar and Timmer, 2007)), which highlight diﬀerences in
the magnitude of growth in capital services per hour and the diﬀerence in capital deepening contributions by
summarising the size of each assets share in total income. In Figure 13 we present the cumulative contribution
of capital deepening in assets to labour productivity growth on the vertical axis. On the horizontal axis we
show the cumulative share of each assets user costs in total income, such that the cumulative total is equal
to the capital income share of approximately one-third. Assets are ranked according to growth in capital
services per hour for each asset, such that the assets nearest the origin have the fastest growth in capital
services per hour and assets furthest from the origin the slowest, giving the diagram a concave shape. In these
diagrams we present capital deepening contributions for the years 2000-13, by country group. In estimating
ICT capital services and ICT capital deepening contributions, we apply the OECD harmonised deﬂators.
From Figure 13 we see that the aggregate contribution of capital deepening is largest in the US (1.04%
pa), followed by South Europe (0.91% pa), then the small North European economies (0.87% pa), then
Scandinavia (0.77% pa), and is smallest in the large North European economies (0.67% pa). The overall
capital share is also largest in the US, at 0.41 compared to 0.36 in South Europe, 0.34 in North Europe (both
small and large), and 0.33 in Scandinavia.
The asset with fastest growth in capital deepening is IT hardware, and this is so for all country groups
considered. IT capital services per hour grew fastest in the small North European economies (11% pa)
and Southern Europe (10.9% pa), followed by the larger North European economies (9.6% pa), Scandinavia
(9.1% pa) and the US (8.3% pa). However, the large North European economies and South Europe have a
smaller IT income share, at 0.007 and 0.006 respectively, compared to 0.011 in the small North European
economies and Scandinavia, and 0.01 in the US.
The asset with second fastest growth in capital deepening is CT equipment, for all country groups except
the small North European economies, where software has the second fastest growth in capital deepening,
and CT equipment the third fastest. CT capital services per hour is similar across country groups, but grew
fastest in Southern Europe (6.4% pa), followed by Scandinavia (6.3% pa), the US (6.1% pa), small North
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Figure 13: Harberger diagrams of the contribution of capital deepening, by country group (2000-2013)
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Small North European; Large North European; and Southern Europe. ICT capital services estimated using OECD
harmonised deﬂators.
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European (5.9% pa) and large North European (5.1% pa).
However, although growth in CT capital capital deepening is fast in comparison to most other assets, the
ﬁgure shows that the share for CT equipment is small in comparison to other assets. The CT income share
is largest in the US (0.015), followed by Scandinavia (0.008), the large North European economies (0.007),
and ﬁnally the small North European economies and Southern Europe (both 0.006).
Figure 13 also shows that the share for R&D is largest in Scandinavia (0.05) and the US (0.048), and
is comparatively larger in North Europe (0.034 in the large North European economies and 0.032 in the
smaller North European economies), compared to South Europe (0.018). The income share for software in
South Europe is also smaller at 0.016, compared to 0.029 in the US, 0.025 in Scandinavia, and 0.022 for both
North European categories.
The ﬁgure also emphasises the dominance of buildings in capital services for all country groups. Growth
in capital deepening in buildings is slow compared to most other assets, but as the ﬁgure shows, its income
share is very large, and this is particularly so for Southern Europe where buildings user costs as a share of
value-added is 0.21, compared to 0.15 in Scandinavia which has the smallest income share for buildings of
the country groups considered here.
5 Conclusions
Numerous studies have documented the advances in ICT and sought to measure its contribution to growth in
GDP or labour productivity. However the focus of these studies has generally been on the contribution of ICT
equipment, with ICT equipment separated out from non-ICT plant & machinery in the estimation of capital
services. The focus on computer hardware or aggregate ICT equipment means however that the C part of
ICT has been somewhat neglected. In this paper, we conduct a sources of growth decomposition for the US
and thirteen EU countries, and estimate the contribution of ICT capital, over the period 1995-2013, under
diﬀerent assumptions regarding its price, with a focus on the contribution of CT equipment. Following on
from the research into IT hardware equipment, we therefore treat all three aspects of ICT capital, including
telecommunications equipment (i.e. IT hardware, CT equipment and software), as distinct assets in the
estimation of capital services, each with their own asset-speciﬁc depreciation rate and price index. We use
these data to review growth-accounting estimates for each of the three types of ICT capital, and present
estimates of the contribution of each ICT asset using (a) national deﬂators as produced by national statistical
institutes, (b) constant-quality harmonised deﬂators from the OECD, and (c) our own constant-quality
harmonised deﬂators constructed for this paper.
We ﬁnd that national price indices for each ICT asset vary considerably. Across countries and between
time periods, and depending on the price index used, we ﬁnd that the contribution of capital deepening in
CT equipment is positive for all countries (including country aggregations) and time periods, and lies in the
range of 0% pa to 0.16% pa. In general, we ﬁnd that the contribution of CT capital deepening was highest in
the late 1990s, and has since declined in the 2000s. The largest contributions from CT capital deepening are
found in the US, at 0.16% pa in 1995-2000, declining to 0.12% pa in 2000-7, 0.1% pa in 2007-10, and 0.04%
pa in 2010-13. In comparison, using national CT deﬂators, contributions for the EU-13 stood at: 0.05% pa in
1995-2000; 0.03% pa in 2000-07; 0.03% pa in 2007-10; and 0.02% pa in the ﬁnal 2010-13 period. Within the
EU-13, we note the largest absolute contributions from CT capital deepening are found in Austria, Sweden,
the UK and Portugal.
Applying harmonised constant-quality price indices for ICT assets raises the EU CT contribution in the
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2000s, but the impact is relatively small. In 2000-07 and 2007-10, the EU CT contribution is raised to
0.04% pa, and in 2010-13, to 0.03% pa. Thus, we estimate that of the diﬀerence in the relative US-EU
CT contributions, only a small proportion is explained by diﬀerences in measures of price change for CT
equipment. For 1995-2000, we estimate that just 4% of the gap in the EU CT contribution relative to the US
can be explained by diﬀerences in price measurement, rising to 16% in the 2000-07 period, 18% in 2007-10,
and 48% in 2010-13. Therefore, we conclude that, in terms of the contribution of CT capital deepening,
diﬀerences between the US and EU-13 are largely due to diﬀerences in the volume of capital services growth
and the magnitude of the CT income share, driven by diﬀerences in the rate of CT investment and the level
of the real CT capital stock. Other parameters such as the CT depreciation rate and holding gains/losses
are not a factor in explaining diﬀerences between countries: we apply the same depreciation rate for CT
capital across countries and the use of harmonised deﬂators also means that changes in valuation are fairly
similar across countries.
This ﬁnding is in contrast to our ﬁndings for IT hardware equipment and software. In the case of IT
hardware, applying OECD harmonised deﬂators raises the EU-13 IT contribution in: 1995-2000, from 0.14%
pa to 0.19% pa; 2000-07, from 0.07% pa to 0.11% pa; 2007-10, from 0.04% pa to 0.05% pa. In 2010-13, the
IT contribution is unchanged at 0.02% pa. We estimate that of the gap in the IT contribution relative to the
US: in 1995-2000, 15% can be explained by diﬀerences in measured IT prices; in 2000-07, as much as 68% of
the gap can be explained by diﬀerences in prices; in 2007-10, 21% of the gap; and ﬁnally in 2010-13, there is
no gap, with EU IT contribution already being higher than that in the US. Applying the GHE harmonised
indices, constructed for this paper, these percentages rise to 43% in 1995-2000, 70% in 2000-07, and 49% in
2010-13.
On software, our ﬁndings are somewhere in between those for CT and IT equipment. Applying OECD
harmonised deﬂators raises the EU-13 software contribution: in 1995-2000, from 0.12% pa to 0.18% pa; in
2000-07, from 0.09% pa to 0.12% pa; in 2007-10, from 0.07% pa to 0.1% pa; and in 2010-13, from 0.06% pa
to 0.09% pa. Thus, in the case of software, the switch from national to OECD harmonised deﬂators explains
34% of the EU-13 gap relative to the US in 1995-2000, 40% of the gap in 2000-07, 25% of the gap in 2007-10,
and over 100% of the gap in 2010-13.
Therefore, we ﬁnd that there are still considerable disparities in measures of ICT price change across
OECD countries. In the case of IT hardware in particular, a substantial component of the diﬀerence in
US and EU contributions is explained by diﬀerences in estimated IT price change. Thus harmonisation
substantially reduces the US-EU gap. However, this is not the case for CT equipment, where harmonisation
of prices only explains a small proportion of the gap in the capital deepening contribution of the EU relative
to the US. Thus diﬀerences in EU-US CT contributions are due to a lower rate of CT investment in EU-13, the
sense of both current and past investments, where the former determine contemporaneous growth in capital
services and the latter determine the level of the real stock. Therefore, in the case of CT equipment, variation
between countries is likely aﬀected by issues such as public policy, public ﬁnances and public investment in
cases where some part or all of the telecoms network infrastructure remains in the non-market sector. The
timing of network build-out and adoption lags are also likely a cause of variation between countries.
In this paper we have estimated the direct eﬀect of telecommunications capital deepening on growth in
labour productivity. However, since telecommunications capital builds networks, then it is also natural to
ask whether there is an indirect eﬀect too, that is implicit in measured TFP. In future work we shall seek to
estimate those indirect network eﬀects and their contribution to growth.
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Table 4: Sources of Growth (1995-2013), national ICT deﬂators
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13
Country Years DlnV/H sDlnL/H sDlnK/H b sDlnK/H v sDlnK/H p sDlnK/H rd sDlnK/H mincop sDlnK/H soft sDlnK/H IT sDlnK/H CT DlnTFP Memo: sLAB =(10/1)
AUT 1995-00 1.83% 0.29% 0.13% 0.06% -0.06% 0.08% 0.00% 0.15% 0.09% 0.08% 1.01% 0.69 4.3%
2000-07 2.02% 0.17% 0.27% 0.03% 0.04% 0.11% 0.00% 0.12% 0.03% 0.00% 1.24% 0.66 0.2%
2007-10 0.44% 0.05% 0.31% 0.00% 0.11% 0.16% 0.00% 0.08% -0.01% 0.03% -0.30% 0.66 6.6%
2010-13 1.00% 0.06% 0.08% 0.05% 0.02% 0.14% 0.00% 0.10% 0.00% 0.02% 0.52% 0.66 2.0%
BEL 1995-00
2000-07 1.43% 0.23% 0.14% 0.12% 0.17% 0.08% 0.00% 0.12% 0.07% 0.01% 0.47% 0.67 0.9%
2007-10 0.16% 0.22% 0.24% -0.01% 0.06% 0.10% 0.01% 0.10% -0.04% 0.03% -0.56% 0.67 20.3%
2010-13 -0.03% 0.23% 0.22% -0.07% -0.09% 0.09% 0.01% 0.07% -0.03% 0.03% -0.48% 0.68 -
DNK 1995-00
2000-07 0.97% 0.13% 0.02% 0.08% 0.08% 0.13% 0.00% 0.08% 0.14% 0.01% 0.30% 0.68 1.0%
2007-10 0.80% 0.05% 0.29% 0.17% 0.04% 0.25% -0.01% 0.14% -0.06% 0.01% -0.09% 0.71 1.0%
2010-13 0.40% 0.06% 0.03% -0.09% -0.06% 0.17% -0.04% 0.07% 0.09% 0.01% 0.15% 0.68 3.5%
ESP 1995-00 -0.01% 0.50% -0.05% 0.14% 0.04% -0.01% 0.00% 0.04% 0.04% 0.01% -0.73% 0.65 -
2000-07 0.48% 0.42% 0.23% 0.11% 0.11% 0.05% 0.01% 0.05% 0.01% 0.00% -0.52% 0.62 0.7%
2007-10 1.88% 0.31% 1.36% -0.04% 0.36% 0.15% 0.01% 0.09% 0.03% 0.04% -0.42% 0.61 1.9%
2010-13 1.67% 0.28% 1.21% 0.00% 0.28% 0.14% 0.04% 0.11% 0.00% 0.03% -0.42% 0.57 1.5%
FIN 1995-00 3.26% 0.07% -0.17% -0.01% -0.09% 0.24% 0.00% 0.09% 0.11% 0.05% 2.98% 0.66 1.4%
2000-07 2.21% 0.18% 0.12% 0.01% 0.00% 0.25% 0.00% 0.11% 0.02% 0.04% 1.46% 0.64 1.8%
2007-10 -0.98% 0.19% 0.40% 0.01% 0.04% 0.27% 0.00% 0.05% 0.05% 0.05% -2.03% 0.67 -
2010-13 -0.11% 0.21% 0.20% -0.01% 0.02% 0.04% 0.00% 0.02% 0.03% 0.02% -0.65% 0.69 -
FRA 1995-00 2.20% 0.44% 0.09% 0.15% 0.15% 0.04% 0.01% 0.15% 0.03% 0.03% 1.11% 0.63 1.2%
2000-07 1.49% 0.20% 0.25% 0.09% 0.13% 0.05% 0.01% 0.13% 0.02% 0.02% 0.57% 0.63 1.5%
2007-10 0.20% 0.16% 0.38% 0.01% 0.10% 0.08% 0.01% 0.14% 0.01% 0.01% -0.69% 0.63 7.1%
2010-13 1.00% 0.16% 0.23% 0.00% 0.03% 0.08% 0.01% 0.10% 0.03% 0.01% 0.36% 0.64 1.0%
GER 1995-00 2.06% -0.03% 0.31% 0.10% 0.29% 0.07% 0.02% 0.08% 0.26% 0.04% 0.93% 0.68 1.8%
2000-07 1.77% 0.07% 0.17% 0.12% 0.27% 0.09% 0.01% 0.06% 0.16% 0.02% 0.80% 0.66 1.2%
2007-10 -0.06% 0.09% 0.17% 0.04% 0.23% 0.12% 0.01% 0.05% 0.13% 0.02% -0.91% 0.65 -
2010-13 1.12% 0.11% 0.08% -0.02% 0.13% 0.10% 0.00% 0.03% 0.03% 0.01% 0.64% 0.67 1.0%
IRL 1995-00
2000-07 2.09% 0.37% 0.88% 0.38% 0.23% 0.61% 0.02% 0.03% 0.08% 0.00% -0.52% 0.54 0.2%
2007-10 3.87% 0.17% 1.96% 0.49% 0.17% 0.85% 0.04% 0.08% 0.05% 0.06% 0.01% 0.62 1.4%
2010-13 0.04% 0.15% 0.28% 0.19% 0.02% 0.53% -0.01% 0.06% -0.02% 0.01% -1.19% 0.61 18.0%
ITA 1995-00 1.04% 0.17% 0.08% 0.06% 0.14% 0.00% 0.00% 0.09% 0.06% 0.03% 0.40% 0.66 3.4%
2000-07 0.11% 0.16% 0.15% 0.03% 0.14% 0.02% 0.00% 0.01% 0.02% 0.02% -0.44% 0.64 19.6%
2007-10 -0.10% 0.05% 0.44% -0.03% 0.19% 0.08% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.03% -0.86% 0.67 -
2010-13 0.35% 0.06% 0.29% -0.12% 0.07% 0.06% -0.01% 0.00% -0.01% 0.03% -0.02% 0.68 9.1%
NLD 1995-00 2.05% 0.10% -0.07% 0.06% 0.16% 0.03% 0.00% 0.20% 0.28% 0.01% 1.28% 0.67 0.3%
2000-07 1.44% 0.30% 0.19% 0.05% 0.02% 0.04% 0.01% 0.12% 0.14% 0.00% 0.57% 0.66 0.2%
2007-10 0.26% 0.07% 0.34% 0.01% 0.08% 0.04% 0.00% 0.14% 0.07% 0.01% -0.50% 0.67 2.6%
2010-13 0.66% 0.08% 0.27% 0.04% 0.03% 0.05% 0.01% 0.11% 0.05% 0.02% 0.02% 0.68 2.3%
PRT 1995-00
2000-07 1.38% 0.87% 0.01% -0.04% 0.18% 0.06% 0.01% 0.06% 0.07% 0.07% 0.09% 0.67 5.2%
2007-10 1.43% 0.55% 0.30% -0.06% 0.25% 0.16% 0.00% 0.05% 0.06% 0.07% 0.04% 0.66 4.8%
2010-13 1.95% 0.56% 0.65% -0.15% 0.08% 0.13% 0.03% 0.06% 0.00% 0.04% 0.55% 0.66 2.1%
SWE 1995-00
2000-07 2.60% 0.21% 0.22% 0.09% 0.26% 0.22% 0.00% 0.09% 0.15% 0.09% 1.27% 0.67 3.3%
2007-10 -0.25% 0.09% 0.29% -0.02% 0.19% 0.12% 0.00% 0.08% 0.04% 0.05% -1.11% 0.66 -
2010-13 0.71% 0.11% 0.18% 0.02% 0.23% 0.07% 0.00% 0.05% 0.08% 0.02% -0.06% 0.65 3.5%
UK 1995-00 2.29% 0.57% 0.37% 0.00% 0.14% 0.01% -0.02% 0.20% 0.20% 0.11% 0.71% 0.67 4.9%
2000-07 2.05% 0.29% 0.42% 0.02% 0.04% 0.03% -0.02% 0.15% 0.06% 0.08% 0.98% 0.69 3.7%
2007-10 -0.24% 0.14% 0.55% 0.00% 0.00% 0.10% -0.01% 0.07% 0.01% 0.03% -1.13% 0.69 -
2010-13 0.31% 0.14% 0.15% -0.08% -0.07% 0.01% -0.01% 0.07% 0.02% 0.00% 0.08% 0.71 -
Country Group Years DlnV/H sDlnL/H sDlnK/H b sDlnK/H v sDlnK/H p sDlnK/H rd sDlnK/H mincop sDlnK/H soft sDlnK/H IT sDlnK/H CT DlnTFP Memo: sLAB =(10/1)
US 1995-00 2.40% 0.15% 0.18% 0.12% 0.10% 0.03% 0.02% 0.30% 0.41% 0.16% 0.94% 0.60 6.5%
2000-07 2.10% 0.21% 0.31% 0.03% 0.24% 0.11% 0.11% 0.18% 0.13% 0.12% 0.66% 0.60 5.6%
2007-10 1.97% 0.14% 0.73% -0.10% 0.31% 0.23% 0.10% 0.18% 0.09% 0.10% 0.21% 0.59 5.0%
2010-13 0.31% 0.15% -0.09% 0.09% 0.02% 0.02% 0.07% 0.07% 0.01% 0.04% -0.06% 0.58 12.6%
Scand 1995-00 3.26% 0.07% -0.17% -0.01% -0.09% 0.24% 0.00% 0.09% 0.11% 0.05% 2.98% 0.66 1.4%
2000-07 2.06% 0.18% 0.14% 0.07% 0.15% 0.20% 0.00% 0.09% 0.11% 0.05% 1.05% 0.66 2.6%
2007-10 -0.15% 0.11% 0.32% 0.04% 0.11% 0.19% 0.00% 0.09% 0.02% 0.04% -1.06% 0.67 -27.1%
2010-13 0.42% 0.12% 0.14% -0.02% 0.10% 0.09% -0.01% 0.05% 0.07% 0.02% -0.14% 0.67 4.9%
N Europe (small) 1995-00 1.98% 0.16% -0.01% 0.06% 0.09% 0.05% 0.00% 0.18% 0.22% 0.03% 1.19% 0.68 1.6%
2000-07 1.62% 0.26% 0.27% 0.10% 0.09% 0.13% 0.01% 0.11% 0.09% 0.01% 0.55% 0.65 0.4%
2007-10 0.68% 0.12% 0.49% 0.06% 0.09% 0.17% 0.01% 0.11% 0.03% 0.02% -0.42% 0.66 3.4%
2010-13 0.49% 0.12% 0.22% 0.03% 0.00% 0.14% 0.01% 0.09% 0.01% 0.02% -0.14% 0.67 3.9%
N Europe (large) 1995-00 2.17% 0.28% 0.26% 0.09% 0.21% 0.05% 0.01% 0.13% 0.17% 0.06% 0.92% 0.66 2.6%
2000-07 1.77% 0.18% 0.27% 0.08% 0.16% 0.06% 0.00% 0.11% 0.09% 0.04% 0.79% 0.66 2.2%
2007-10 -0.03% 0.12% 0.34% 0.02% 0.12% 0.10% 0.00% 0.08% 0.06% 0.02% -0.90% 0.66 -
2010-13 0.85% 0.14% 0.14% -0.03% 0.04% 0.07% 0.00% 0.06% 0.03% 0.01% 0.40% 0.67 0.8%
S Europe 1995-00 0.66% 0.29% 0.04% 0.09% 0.10% -0.01% 0.00% 0.07% 0.06% 0.03% -0.01% 0.65 4.1%
2000-07 0.34% 0.31% 0.17% 0.06% 0.14% 0.03% 0.00% 0.03% 0.02% 0.02% -0.43% 0.63 5.4%
2007-10 0.81% 0.19% 0.80% -0.04% 0.26% 0.11% 0.01% 0.04% 0.01% 0.03% -0.61% 0.64 4.1%
2010-13 0.97% 0.18% 0.68% -0.07% 0.15% 0.10% 0.01% 0.05% -0.01% 0.03% -0.14% 0.64 3.1%
EU_13 1995-00 1.75% 0.27% 0.17% 0.08% 0.16% 0.04% 0.00% 0.12% 0.14% 0.05% 0.71% 0.66 2.6%
2000-07 1.39% 0.22% 0.24% 0.08% 0.14% 0.07% 0.00% 0.09% 0.07% 0.03% 0.45% 0.65 2.2%
2007-10 0.28% 0.14% 0.49% 0.01% 0.16% 0.12% 0.00% 0.07% 0.04% 0.03% -0.77% 0.65 9.6%
2010-13 0.81% 0.14% 0.29% -0.03% 0.07% 0.08% 0.00% 0.06% 0.02% 0.02% 0.16% 0.66 1.9%
All countries 1995-00 2.11% 0.20% 0.18% 0.11% 0.13% 0.03% 0.01% 0.22% 0.29% 0.11% 0.83% 0.63 5.0%
2000-07 1.76% 0.22% 0.28% 0.05% 0.19% 0.09% 0.06% 0.13% 0.10% 0.08% 0.56% 0.63 4.3%
2007-10 1.16% 0.14% 0.61% -0.05% 0.23% 0.18% 0.05% 0.13% 0.06% 0.06% -0.26% 0.62 5.5%
2010-13 0.55% 0.15% 0.09% 0.03% 0.05% 0.05% 0.04% 0.07% 0.01% 0.03% 0.05% 0.62 5.1%
Notes to table: Data are average growth rates per year for intervals shown, calculated as changes in natural logs. Contributions
are Tornqvist indices. Column 1 is labour productivity growth in per hour terms. Column 2 is the contribution of labour
composition, namely growth in labour services per hour times share of labour in GVA. Column 3 is the contribution of buildings
capital deepening, namely growth in buildings capital services per hour times share of buildings in GVA. Column 4 is growth
in vehicles capital services per hour times share in GVA. Column 5 is growth in plant & machinery capital services per hour
times share in GVA. Column 6 is growth in R&D capital services per hour times share in GVA. Column 7 is growth in mineral
exploration and artistic originals capital services per hour times share in GVA. Column 8 is growth in software capital services
per hour times share in GVA. Column 9 is growth in IT hardware capital services per hour times share in GVA. Column 10 is
growth in CT equipment capital services per hour times share in GVA. Column 11 is TFP, namely column 1 minus the sum
of columns 2 to 10. Columns 12 and 13 are memo items: column 12 is the share of labour payments in GVA and column 13
is the share of labour productivity growth accounted for by the contribution of CT capital deepening, estimated as column 10
over column 1. In column 13, negative estimates caused by either negative growth in labour productivity or negative growth
in CT capital deepening are suppressed. Country groups are as follows: Scand consists of Denmark, Finland and Sweden; N
Europe (small) consists of Austria, Belgium, Ireland and the Netherlands; N Europe (large) consists of France, Germany and
the UK; and S Europe consists of Italy, Portugal and Spain. Note, countries with missing data are excluded from country
groups and the all countries aggregate, thus Belgium, Denmark, Ireland, Portugal and Sweden are excluded from aggregates
for the 1995-00 period.
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Table 5: Sources of Growth (1995-2013), OECD Harmonised ICT deﬂators
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13
Country Years DlnV/H sDlnL/H sDlnK/H b sDlnK/H v sDlnK/H p sDlnK/H rd sDlnK/H mincop sDlnK/H soft sDlnK/H IT sDlnK/H CT DlnTFP Memo: sLAB =(10/1)
AUT 1995-00 1.83% 0.29% 0.13% 0.06% -0.06% 0.08% 0.00% 0.18% 0.17% 0.11% 0.86% 0.69 6.0%
2000-07 2.02% 0.17% 0.27% 0.03% 0.04% 0.11% 0.00% 0.16% 0.13% 0.07% 1.04% 0.66 3.6%
2007-10 0.44% 0.05% 0.31% 0.00% 0.11% 0.16% 0.00% 0.11% 0.04% 0.10% -0.46% 0.66 22.7%
2010-13 1.00% 0.06% 0.08% 0.05% 0.02% 0.14% 0.00% 0.12% 0.01% 0.06% 0.43% 0.66 6.4%
BEL 1995-00
2000-07 1.43% 0.23% 0.14% 0.12% 0.17% 0.08% 0.00% 0.12% 0.28% 0.03% 0.25% 0.67 2.2%
2007-10 0.16% 0.22% 0.24% -0.01% 0.06% 0.10% 0.01% 0.13% 0.08% 0.06% -0.74% 0.67 38.8%
2010-13 -0.03% 0.23% 0.22% -0.07% -0.09% 0.09% 0.01% 0.10% 0.04% 0.06% -0.61% 0.68 -
DNK 1995-00 1.44% 0.25% -0.16% 0.12% 0.02% 0.12% 0.01% 0.18% 0.35% 0.01% 0.54% 0.67 0.7%
2000-07 0.97% 0.13% 0.02% 0.08% 0.08% 0.13% 0.00% 0.13% 0.31% 0.01% 0.08% 0.68 1.0%
2007-10 0.80% 0.05% 0.29% 0.17% 0.04% 0.25% -0.01% 0.21% 0.00% 0.01% -0.22% 0.71 1.1%
2010-13 0.40% 0.06% 0.03% -0.09% -0.06% 0.17% -0.04% 0.14% 0.12% 0.02% 0.06% 0.68 3.9%
ESP 1995-00 -0.01% 0.50% -0.05% 0.14% 0.03% -0.01% 0.00% 0.08% 0.14% 0.02% -0.86% 0.65 -
2000-07 0.48% 0.42% 0.23% 0.11% 0.11% 0.05% 0.01% 0.11% 0.10% 0.03% -0.69% 0.62 6.4%
2007-10 1.88% 0.31% 1.36% -0.04% 0.36% 0.15% 0.01% 0.15% 0.07% 0.06% -0.55% 0.61 3.2%
2010-13 1.67% 0.28% 1.21% 0.00% 0.28% 0.14% 0.04% 0.17% 0.02% 0.04% -0.52% 0.57 2.5%
FIN 1995-00 3.26% 0.07% -0.17% -0.01% -0.09% 0.24% 0.00% 0.11% 0.10% 0.06% 2.96% 0.66 1.8%
2000-07 2.21% 0.18% 0.12% 0.01% 0.00% 0.25% 0.00% 0.13% 0.03% 0.05% 1.42% 0.64 2.3%
2007-10 -0.98% 0.19% 0.40% 0.01% 0.04% 0.27% 0.00% 0.08% 0.04% 0.04% -2.04% 0.67 -
2010-13 -0.11% 0.21% 0.20% -0.01% 0.02% 0.04% 0.00% 0.05% 0.02% 0.02% -0.65% 0.69 -
FRA 1995-00 2.20% 0.44% 0.09% 0.15% 0.15% 0.04% 0.01% 0.29% 0.09% 0.04% 0.89% 0.63 1.9%
2000-07 1.49% 0.20% 0.25% 0.09% 0.13% 0.05% 0.01% 0.21% 0.06% 0.05% 0.44% 0.63 3.1%
2007-10 0.20% 0.16% 0.38% 0.01% 0.10% 0.08% 0.01% 0.16% 0.02% 0.03% -0.74% 0.63 16.1%
2010-13 1.00% 0.16% 0.23% 0.00% 0.03% 0.08% 0.01% 0.13% 0.02% 0.02% 0.32% 0.64 2.3%
GER 1995-00 2.06% -0.03% 0.30% 0.10% 0.28% 0.07% 0.02% 0.09% 0.26% 0.04% 0.92% 0.68 1.9%
2000-07 1.77% 0.07% 0.17% 0.12% 0.27% 0.09% 0.01% 0.07% 0.12% 0.04% 0.82% 0.66 2.1%
2007-10 -0.06% 0.09% 0.17% 0.04% 0.23% 0.12% 0.01% 0.04% 0.08% 0.04% -0.88% 0.65 -
2010-13 1.12% 0.11% 0.08% -0.02% 0.13% 0.10% 0.00% 0.03% 0.02% 0.02% 0.64% 0.67 1.9%
IRL 1995-00
2000-07 2.09% 0.37% 0.88% 0.38% 0.23% 0.61% 0.02% 0.07% 0.11% 0.02% -0.61% 0.54 1.1%
2007-10 3.87% 0.17% 1.96% 0.49% 0.17% 0.85% 0.04% 0.12% 0.11% 0.07% -0.11% 0.62 1.8%
2010-13 0.04% 0.15% 0.28% 0.19% 0.02% 0.53% -0.01% 0.11% 0.07% 0.05% -1.36% 0.61 128.9%
ITA 1995-00 1.04% 0.17% 0.08% 0.06% 0.14% 0.00% 0.00% 0.15% 0.14% 0.04% 0.26% 0.66 3.7%
2000-07 0.11% 0.16% 0.15% 0.03% 0.14% 0.02% 0.00% 0.07% 0.10% 0.04% -0.60% 0.64 39.6%
2007-10 -0.10% 0.05% 0.44% -0.03% 0.19% 0.08% 0.00% 0.05% 0.03% 0.04% -0.95% 0.67 -
2010-13 0.35% 0.06% 0.29% -0.12% 0.07% 0.06% -0.01% 0.04% 0.01% 0.05% -0.10% 0.68 13.0%
NLD 1995-00 2.05% 0.10% -0.07% 0.06% 0.16% 0.03% 0.00% 0.25% 0.26% 0.00% 1.26% 0.67 0.0%
2000-07 1.44% 0.30% 0.19% 0.05% 0.02% 0.04% 0.01% 0.20% 0.16% 0.01% 0.48% 0.66 0.5%
2007-10 0.26% 0.07% 0.34% 0.01% 0.08% 0.04% 0.00% 0.19% 0.07% 0.01% -0.56% 0.67 4.5%
2010-13 0.66% 0.08% 0.27% 0.04% 0.03% 0.05% 0.01% 0.12% 0.05% 0.02% 0.00% 0.68 3.0%
PRT 1995-00
2000-07 1.38% 0.87% 0.01% -0.04% 0.18% 0.06% 0.01% 0.10% 0.18% 0.08% -0.06% 0.67 6.1%
2007-10 1.43% 0.55% 0.30% -0.06% 0.25% 0.16% 0.00% 0.09% 0.06% 0.06% 0.01% 0.66 4.1%
2010-13 1.95% 0.56% 0.65% -0.15% 0.08% 0.13% 0.03% 0.08% 0.00% 0.04% 0.54% 0.66 1.9%
SWE 1995-00
2000-07 2.60% 0.21% 0.22% 0.09% 0.26% 0.22% 0.00% 0.18% 0.17% 0.10% 1.15% 0.67 3.8%
2007-10 -0.25% 0.09% 0.29% -0.02% 0.19% 0.12% 0.00% 0.11% 0.00% 0.08% -1.13% 0.66 -
2010-13 0.71% 0.11% 0.18% 0.02% 0.23% 0.07% 0.00% 0.09% 0.01% 0.03% -0.03% 0.65 4.8%
UK 1995-00 2.29% 0.57% 0.37% 0.00% 0.14% 0.01% -0.02% 0.26% 0.23% 0.12% 0.61% 0.67 5.0%
2000-07 2.05% 0.29% 0.42% 0.02% 0.04% 0.03% -0.02% 0.15% 0.10% 0.06% 0.96% 0.69 2.8%
2007-10 -0.24% 0.14% 0.55% 0.00% 0.00% 0.10% -0.01% 0.08% 0.03% 0.02% -1.14% 0.69 -
2010-13 0.31% 0.14% 0.15% -0.08% -0.07% 0.01% -0.01% 0.08% 0.04% 0.00% 0.05% 0.71 0.2%
Country Group Years DlnV/H sDlnL/H sDlnK/H b sDlnK/H v sDlnK/H p sDlnK/H rd sDlnK/H mincop sDlnK/H soft sDlnK/H IT sDlnK/H CT DlnTFP Memo: sLAB =(10/1)
US 1995-00 2.40% 0.15% 0.18% 0.12% 0.10% 0.04% 0.02% 0.30% 0.41% 0.16% 0.92% 0.60 6.5%
2000-07 2.10% 0.21% 0.32% 0.03% 0.24% 0.10% 0.11% 0.18% 0.13% 0.12% 0.65% 0.60 5.6%
2007-10 1.97% 0.14% 0.74% -0.10% 0.31% 0.21% 0.10% 0.18% 0.09% 0.10% 0.22% 0.59 5.0%
2010-13 0.31% 0.15% -0.09% 0.09% 0.02% 0.01% 0.07% 0.07% 0.01% 0.04% -0.05% 0.58 12.6%
Scand 1995-00 2.28% 0.17% -0.16% 0.06% -0.03% 0.19% 0.00% 0.15% 0.24% 0.03% 1.64% 0.67 1.4%
2000-07 2.06% 0.18% 0.14% 0.07% 0.15% 0.18% 0.00% 0.16% 0.17% 0.06% 0.95% 0.66 3.1%
2007-10 -0.15% 0.11% 0.32% 0.04% 0.11% 0.18% 0.00% 0.13% 0.01% 0.05% -1.10% 0.67 -33.2%
2010-13 0.42% 0.12% 0.14% -0.02% 0.10% 0.07% -0.01% 0.09% 0.04% 0.02% -0.14% 0.67 5.8%
N Europe (small) 1995-00 1.98% 0.16% -0.01% 0.06% 0.09% 0.05% 0.00% 0.23% 0.23% 0.04% 1.13% 0.68 1.8%
2000-07 1.62% 0.26% 0.27% 0.10% 0.09% 0.12% 0.01% 0.16% 0.18% 0.03% 0.41% 0.65 1.7%
2007-10 0.68% 0.12% 0.50% 0.06% 0.09% 0.16% 0.01% 0.15% 0.07% 0.05% -0.52% 0.66 7.1%
2010-13 0.49% 0.12% 0.22% 0.03% 0.00% 0.13% 0.01% 0.12% 0.04% 0.04% -0.22% 0.67 8.7%
N Europe (large) 1995-00 2.17% 0.28% 0.27% 0.09% 0.21% 0.04% 0.01% 0.20% 0.20% 0.06% 0.82% 0.66 2.9%
2000-07 1.77% 0.18% 0.27% 0.08% 0.16% 0.06% 0.00% 0.13% 0.10% 0.05% 0.75% 0.66 2.6%
2007-10 -0.03% 0.12% 0.35% 0.02% 0.12% 0.10% 0.00% 0.09% 0.05% 0.03% -0.91% 0.66 -
2010-13 0.85% 0.14% 0.15% -0.03% 0.05% 0.06% 0.00% 0.07% 0.02% 0.02% 0.38% 0.67 1.9%
S Europe 1995-00 0.66% 0.29% 0.04% 0.09% 0.10% -0.01% 0.00% 0.13% 0.14% 0.03% -0.14% 0.65 4.6%
2000-07 0.34% 0.31% 0.17% 0.06% 0.14% 0.03% 0.00% 0.08% 0.11% 0.04% -0.60% 0.63 12.3%
2007-10 0.81% 0.19% 0.80% -0.04% 0.26% 0.11% 0.01% 0.09% 0.05% 0.05% -0.72% 0.64 6.2%
2010-13 0.97% 0.18% 0.68% -0.07% 0.15% 0.08% 0.01% 0.09% 0.01% 0.04% -0.21% 0.64 4.5%
EU_13 1995-00 1.75% 0.27% 0.17% 0.09% 0.16% 0.04% 0.00% 0.18% 0.19% 0.05% 0.61% 0.66 2.9%
2000-07 1.39% 0.22% 0.24% 0.08% 0.14% 0.07% 0.00% 0.12% 0.11% 0.04% 0.36% 0.65 3.1%
2007-10 0.28% 0.14% 0.49% 0.01% 0.16% 0.12% 0.00% 0.10% 0.05% 0.04% -0.82% 0.65 14.1%
2010-13 0.81% 0.14% 0.29% -0.03% 0.07% 0.08% 0.00% 0.09% 0.02% 0.03% 0.12% 0.66 3.3%
All countries 1995-00 2.10% 0.20% 0.17% 0.11% 0.13% 0.04% 0.01% 0.24% 0.31% 0.11% 0.79% 0.63 5.1%
2000-07 1.76% 0.22% 0.28% 0.05% 0.19% 0.09% 0.06% 0.15% 0.12% 0.08% 0.51% 0.63 4.7%
2007-10 1.16% 0.14% 0.61% -0.05% 0.23% 0.18% 0.05% 0.14% 0.07% 0.07% -0.28% 0.62 6.1%
2010-13 0.55% 0.15% 0.09% 0.03% 0.05% 0.05% 0.04% 0.08% 0.02% 0.03% 0.03% 0.62 6.0%
Notes to table: Data are average growth rates per year for intervals shown, calculated as changes in natural logs. Contributions
are Tornqvist indices. Column 1 is labour productivity growth in per hour terms. Column 2 is the contribution of labour
composition, namely growth in labour services per hour times share of labour in GVA. Column 3 is the contribution of buildings
capital deepening, namely growth in buildings capital services per hour times share of buildings in GVA. Column 4 is growth
in vehicles capital services per hour times share in GVA. Column 5 is growth in plant & machinery capital services per hour
times share in GVA. Column 6 is growth in R&D capital services per hour times share in GVA. Column 7 is growth in mineral
exploration and artistic originals capital services per hour times share in GVA. Column 8 is growth in software capital services
per hour times share in GVA. Column 9 is growth in IT hardware capital services per hour times share in GVA. Column 10 is
growth in CT equipment capital services per hour times share in GVA. Column 11 is TFP, namely column 1 minus the sum of
columns 2 to 10. Columns 12 and 13 are memo items: column 12 is the share of labour payments in GVA and column 13 is the
share of labour productivity growth accounted for by the contribution of CT capital deepening, estimated as column 10 over
column 1. In column 13, negative estimates caused by either negative growth in labour productivity or negative growth in CT
capital deepening are suppressed. Country groups are as follows: Scand consists of Denmark, Finland and Sweden; N Europe
(small) consists of Austria, Belgium, Ireland and the Netherlands; N Europe (large) consists of France, Germany and the UK;
and S Europe consists of Italy, Portugal and Spain. Note, countries with missing data are excluded from country groups and
the all countries aggregate, thus Belgium, Ireland, Portugal and Sweden are excluded from aggregates for the 1995-00 period.
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Table 6: Sources of Growth (1995-2013), GHE Harmonised ICT deﬂators
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13
Country Years DlnV/H sDlnL/H sDlnK/H b sDlnK/H v sDlnK/H p sDlnK/H rd sDlnK/H mincop sDlnK/H soft sDlnK/H IT sDlnK/H CT DlnTFP Memo: sLAB =(10/1)
AUT 1995-00 1.83% 0.29% 0.13% 0.06% -0.06% 0.08% 0.00% 0.18% 0.24% 0.10% 0.80% 0.69 5.6%
2000-07 2.02% 0.17% 0.27% 0.03% 0.04% 0.11% 0.00% 0.15% 0.13% 0.07% 1.05% 0.66 3.6%
2007-10 0.44% 0.05% 0.31% 0.00% 0.11% 0.16% 0.00% 0.11% 0.06% 0.10% -0.46% 0.66 21.9%
2010-13 1.00% 0.06% 0.08% 0.05% 0.02% 0.14% 0.00% 0.13% 0.02% 0.06% 0.42% 0.66 5.7%
BEL 1995-00
2000-07 1.43% 0.23% 0.14% 0.12% 0.17% 0.08% 0.00% 0.10% 0.28% 0.03% 0.27% 0.67 2.1%
2007-10 0.16% 0.22% 0.24% -0.01% 0.06% 0.10% 0.01% 0.12% 0.11% 0.06% -0.75% 0.67 36.2%
2010-13 -0.03% 0.23% 0.22% -0.07% -0.09% 0.09% 0.01% 0.11% 0.06% 0.06% -0.63% 0.68 -
DNK 1995-00 1.44% 0.25% -0.16% 0.12% 0.02% 0.12% 0.01% 0.18% 0.55% 0.01% 0.34% 0.67 0.8%
2000-07 0.97% 0.13% 0.02% 0.08% 0.08% 0.13% 0.00% 0.12% 0.31% 0.01% 0.08% 0.68 1.1%
2007-10 0.80% 0.05% 0.29% 0.17% 0.04% 0.25% -0.01% 0.17% 0.01% 0.01% -0.18% 0.71 0.9%
2010-13 0.40% 0.06% 0.03% -0.09% -0.06% 0.17% -0.04% 0.11% 0.12% 0.01% 0.08% 0.68 3.2%
ESP 1995-00 -0.01% 0.50% -0.05% 0.14% 0.04% -0.01% 0.00% 0.07% 0.20% 0.02% -0.92% 0.65 -
2000-07 0.48% 0.42% 0.23% 0.11% 0.11% 0.05% 0.01% 0.09% 0.10% 0.03% -0.67% 0.62 6.0%
2007-10 1.88% 0.31% 1.36% -0.04% 0.36% 0.15% 0.01% 0.12% 0.08% 0.05% -0.51% 0.61 2.7%
2010-13 1.67% 0.28% 1.21% 0.00% 0.28% 0.14% 0.04% 0.16% 0.03% 0.04% -0.51% 0.57 2.2%
FIN 1995-00 3.26% 0.07% -0.17% -0.01% -0.09% 0.24% 0.00% 0.09% 0.16% 0.05% 2.91% 0.66 1.6%
2000-07 2.21% 0.18% 0.12% 0.01% 0.00% 0.25% 0.00% 0.14% 0.04% 0.05% 1.41% 0.64 2.5%
2007-10 -0.98% 0.19% 0.40% 0.01% 0.04% 0.27% 0.00% 0.08% 0.05% 0.04% -2.05% 0.67 -
2010-13 -0.11% 0.21% 0.20% -0.01% 0.02% 0.04% 0.00% 0.05% 0.03% 0.01% -0.66% 0.69 -
FRA 1995-00 2.20% 0.44% 0.09% 0.15% 0.15% 0.04% 0.01% 0.25% 0.12% 0.04% 0.90% 0.63 1.7%
2000-07 1.49% 0.20% 0.25% 0.09% 0.13% 0.05% 0.01% 0.19% 0.06% 0.05% 0.46% 0.63 3.1%
2007-10 0.20% 0.16% 0.38% 0.01% 0.10% 0.08% 0.01% 0.15% 0.02% 0.03% -0.74% 0.63 15.4%
2010-13 1.00% 0.16% 0.23% 0.00% 0.03% 0.08% 0.01% 0.16% 0.02% 0.02% 0.29% 0.64 2.2%
GER 1995-00 2.06% -0.03% 0.30% 0.10% 0.28% 0.07% 0.02% 0.08% 0.35% 0.04% 0.84% 0.68 1.7%
2000-07 1.77% 0.07% 0.17% 0.12% 0.27% 0.09% 0.01% 0.06% 0.13% 0.04% 0.82% 0.66 2.1%
2007-10 -0.06% 0.09% 0.17% 0.04% 0.23% 0.12% 0.01% 0.05% 0.11% 0.04% -0.90% 0.65 -
2010-13 1.12% 0.11% 0.08% -0.02% 0.13% 0.10% 0.00% 0.04% 0.03% 0.02% 0.62% 0.67 1.8%
IRL 1995-00
2000-07 2.09% 0.37% 0.88% 0.38% 0.23% 0.61% 0.02% 0.06% 0.10% 0.02% -0.59% 0.54 0.9%
2007-10 3.87% 0.17% 1.96% 0.49% 0.17% 0.85% 0.04% 0.11% 0.12% 0.07% -0.11% 0.62 1.7%
2010-13 0.04% 0.15% 0.28% 0.19% 0.02% 0.53% -0.01% 0.09% 0.06% 0.04% -1.33% 0.61 99.2%
ITA 1995-00 1.04% 0.17% 0.08% 0.06% 0.14% 0.00% 0.00% 0.13% 0.19% 0.04% 0.23% 0.66 3.7%
2000-07 0.11% 0.16% 0.15% 0.03% 0.14% 0.02% 0.00% 0.05% 0.10% 0.04% -0.58% 0.64 39.1%
2007-10 -0.10% 0.05% 0.44% -0.03% 0.19% 0.08% 0.00% 0.04% 0.04% 0.04% -0.95% 0.67 -
2010-13 0.35% 0.06% 0.29% -0.12% 0.07% 0.06% -0.01% 0.05% 0.02% 0.04% -0.12% 0.68 12.3%
NLD 1995-00 2.05% 0.10% -0.07% 0.06% 0.16% 0.03% 0.00% 0.22% 0.36% 0.01% 1.17% 0.67 0.3%
2000-07 1.44% 0.30% 0.19% 0.05% 0.02% 0.04% 0.01% 0.18% 0.16% 0.01% 0.49% 0.66 0.6%
2007-10 0.26% 0.07% 0.34% 0.01% 0.08% 0.04% 0.00% 0.19% 0.09% 0.01% -0.58% 0.67 4.5%
2010-13 0.66% 0.08% 0.27% 0.04% 0.03% 0.05% 0.01% 0.14% 0.06% 0.02% -0.03% 0.68 2.9%
PRT 1995-00
2000-07 1.38% 0.87% 0.01% -0.04% 0.18% 0.06% 0.01% 0.09% 0.17% 0.08% -0.04% 0.67 5.7%
2007-10 1.43% 0.55% 0.30% -0.06% 0.25% 0.16% 0.00% 0.08% 0.08% 0.05% 0.01% 0.66 3.5%
2010-13 1.95% 0.56% 0.65% -0.15% 0.08% 0.13% 0.03% 0.08% 0.01% 0.03% 0.54% 0.66 1.6%
SWE 1995-00
2000-07 2.60% 0.21% 0.22% 0.09% 0.26% 0.22% 0.00% 0.19% 0.18% 0.11% 1.12% 0.67 4.2%
2007-10 -0.25% 0.09% 0.29% -0.02% 0.19% 0.12% 0.00% 0.11% 0.03% 0.08% -1.15% 0.66 -
2010-13 0.71% 0.11% 0.18% 0.02% 0.23% 0.07% 0.00% 0.09% 0.02% 0.03% -0.03% 0.65 4.0%
UK 1995-00 2.29% 0.57% 0.37% 0.00% 0.14% 0.01% -0.02% 0.22% 0.32% 0.09% 0.59% 0.67 4.1%
2000-07 2.05% 0.29% 0.42% 0.02% 0.04% 0.03% -0.02% 0.12% 0.10% 0.05% 1.00% 0.69 2.5%
2007-10 -0.24% 0.14% 0.55% 0.00% 0.00% 0.10% -0.01% 0.05% 0.04% 0.02% -1.11% 0.69 -
2010-13 0.31% 0.14% 0.15% -0.08% -0.07% 0.01% -0.01% 0.07% 0.05% -0.01% 0.07% 0.71 -
Country Group Years DlnV/H sDlnL/H sDlnK/H b sDlnK/H v sDlnK/H p sDlnK/H rd sDlnK/H mincop sDlnK/H soft sDlnK/H IT sDlnK/H CT DlnTFP Memo: sLAB =(10/1)
US 1995-00 2.40% 0.15% 0.18% 0.12% 0.10% 0.03% 0.02% 0.30% 0.41% 0.16% 0.94% 0.60 6.5%
2000-07 2.10% 0.21% 0.31% 0.03% 0.24% 0.11% 0.11% 0.18% 0.13% 0.12% 0.66% 0.60 5.6%
2007-10 1.97% 0.14% 0.73% -0.10% 0.31% 0.23% 0.10% 0.18% 0.09% 0.10% 0.21% 0.59 5.0%
2010-13 0.31% 0.15% -0.09% 0.09% 0.02% 0.02% 0.07% 0.07% 0.01% 0.04% -0.06% 0.58 12.6%
Scand 1995-00 2.28% 0.17% -0.16% 0.06% -0.03% 0.18% 0.00% 0.14% 0.37% 0.03% 1.52% 0.67 1.3%
2000-07 2.06% 0.18% 0.14% 0.07% 0.15% 0.20% 0.00% 0.16% 0.18% 0.07% 0.91% 0.66 3.3%
2007-10 -0.15% 0.11% 0.32% 0.04% 0.11% 0.19% 0.00% 0.12% 0.03% 0.05% -1.11% 0.67 -32.4%
2010-13 0.42% 0.12% 0.14% -0.02% 0.10% 0.09% -0.01% 0.09% 0.05% 0.02% -0.15% 0.67 4.8%
N Europe (small) 1995-00 1.98% 0.16% -0.01% 0.06% 0.09% 0.05% 0.00% 0.21% 0.32% 0.04% 1.05% 0.68 1.9%
2000-07 1.62% 0.26% 0.27% 0.10% 0.09% 0.13% 0.01% 0.14% 0.18% 0.03% 0.42% 0.65 1.7%
2007-10 0.68% 0.12% 0.49% 0.06% 0.09% 0.17% 0.01% 0.15% 0.09% 0.05% -0.54% 0.66 6.7%
2010-13 0.49% 0.12% 0.22% 0.03% 0.00% 0.14% 0.01% 0.12% 0.05% 0.04% -0.24% 0.67 7.9%
N Europe (large) 1995-00 2.17% 0.28% 0.26% 0.09% 0.21% 0.05% 0.01% 0.17% 0.28% 0.05% 0.79% 0.66 2.4%
2000-07 1.77% 0.18% 0.27% 0.08% 0.16% 0.06% 0.00% 0.11% 0.10% 0.04% 0.77% 0.66 2.5%
2007-10 -0.03% 0.12% 0.34% 0.02% 0.12% 0.10% 0.00% 0.08% 0.06% 0.03% -0.91% 0.66 -
2010-13 0.85% 0.14% 0.14% -0.03% 0.05% 0.07% 0.00% 0.08% 0.03% 0.01% 0.37% 0.67 1.5%
S Europe 1995-00 0.66% 0.29% 0.04% 0.09% 0.10% -0.01% 0.00% 0.11% 0.19% 0.03% -0.18% 0.65 4.8%
2000-07 0.34% 0.31% 0.17% 0.06% 0.14% 0.03% 0.00% 0.07% 0.10% 0.04% -0.58% 0.63 11.8%
2007-10 0.81% 0.19% 0.80% -0.04% 0.26% 0.11% 0.01% 0.07% 0.06% 0.04% -0.70% 0.64 5.4%
2010-13 0.97% 0.18% 0.68% -0.07% 0.15% 0.10% 0.01% 0.10% 0.02% 0.04% -0.22% 0.64 4.1%
EU_13 1995-00 1.75% 0.27% 0.17% 0.09% 0.16% 0.04% 0.00% 0.16% 0.26% 0.05% 0.57% 0.66 2.6%
2000-07 1.39% 0.22% 0.24% 0.08% 0.14% 0.07% 0.00% 0.11% 0.11% 0.04% 0.38% 0.65 3.0%
2007-10 0.28% 0.14% 0.49% 0.01% 0.16% 0.12% 0.00% 0.09% 0.06% 0.04% -0.82% 0.65 12.9%
2010-13 0.81% 0.14% 0.29% -0.03% 0.07% 0.08% 0.00% 0.09% 0.03% 0.02% 0.11% 0.66 2.9%
All countries 1995-00 2.10% 0.20% 0.17% 0.11% 0.13% 0.04% 0.01% 0.23% 0.34% 0.11% 0.77% 0.63 5.0%
2000-07 1.76% 0.22% 0.28% 0.05% 0.19% 0.09% 0.06% 0.14% 0.12% 0.08% 0.52% 0.63 4.6%
2007-10 1.16% 0.14% 0.61% -0.05% 0.23% 0.18% 0.05% 0.13% 0.07% 0.07% -0.28% 0.62 5.9%
2010-13 0.55% 0.15% 0.09% 0.03% 0.05% 0.05% 0.04% 0.08% 0.02% 0.03% 0.02% 0.62 5.8%
Notes to table: Data are average growth rates per year for intervals shown, calculated as changes in natural logs. Contributions
are Tornqvist indices. Column 1 is labour productivity growth in per hour terms. Column 2 is the contribution of labour
composition, namely growth in labour services per hour times share of labour in GVA. Column 3 is the contribution of buildings
capital deepening, namely growth in buildings capital services per hour times share of buildings in GVA. Column 4 is growth
in vehicles capital services per hour times share in GVA. Column 5 is growth in plant & machinery capital services per hour
times share in GVA. Column 6 is growth in R&D capital services per hour times share in GVA. Column 7 is growth in mineral
exploration and artistic originals capital services per hour times share in GVA. Column 8 is growth in software capital services
per hour times share in GVA. Column 9 is growth in IT hardware capital services per hour times share in GVA. Column 10 is
growth in CT equipment capital services per hour times share in GVA. Column 11 is TFP, namely column 1 minus the sum of
columns 2 to 10. Columns 12 and 13 are memo items: column 12 is the share of labour payments in GVA and column 13 is the
share of labour productivity growth accounted for by the contribution of CT capital deepening, estimated as column 10 over
column 1. In column 13, negative estimates caused by either negative growth in labour productivity or negative growth in CT
capital deepening are suppressed. Country groups are as follows: Scand consists of Denmark, Finland and Sweden; N Europe
(small) consists of Austria, Belgium, Ireland and the Netherlands; N Europe (large) consists of France, Germany and the UK;
and S Europe consists of Italy, Portugal and Spain. Note, countries with missing data are excluded from country groups and
the all countries aggregate, thus Belgium, Ireland, Portugal and Sweden are excluded from aggregates for the 1995-00 period.
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